Top Secret; Priority; NodisTelegram From the United States Embassy in Israel to the Department of State in Washington DC
Tel Aviv, May 30, 1967, 0900Z.
Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received at 7:05 a.m.
Net Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28055.htm
3857. 1. In hour long meeting at his request Eban reviewed to me developments to date and Israelis' current concerns and ideas as to next steps.
2. He said Cabinet decision on May 28 not to go it alone had been taken decisively in closely balanced situation largely on basis message received by Prime Minister that morning and on his (Eban's) report his conversation Washington. Cabinet fully persuaded by his report of wisdom playing out diplomatic hand including the Security Council on understanding that effective enforcement capabilities to assure assertion of right to free and innocent passage through the Straits would be marshalled during same period. The relatively few additional politicians such as the Security and Foreign Affairs Committee to which he had also been able to make his classified exposition had also welcomed US position. However, Eban sensed that the widespread uninformed public here is becoming increasingly uneasy as to just where Israel stands in the diplomatic arena. Consequently, while he does not advocate any public revelation results his Washington conversations he would appreciate it if anything could be done in the background, perhaps off the record with the press in the United States, to re-emphasize determination displayed by President in latter's May 23 statement.
3. Turning to the Security Council, Eban said he could not urge too strongly that we avoid any resolution on the legal rights of free and innocent passage through the Straits. He said he had discussed this with Ambassador Goldberg on his way back to Israel. In Eban's view, any effort discuss such a resolution would inevitably give opponents opportunity to becloud and weaken essential impression of world support such legal rights. He strongly urged that instead we follow 1957 General Assembly procedure of tabling a declaration by those powers willing to agree on legal validity of rights. He added a general resolution by the Security Council in favor of peace and tranquility would be acceptable provided its negotiation did not unduly protract Security Council deliberations. He emphasized that situation still so delicate that time is very limited. Eban said he considering going to New York for Security Council meeting. He would like to put Israeli case personally. However, he had not yet made up his mind. He feels such trip might be misinterpreted here publicly as suggesting too much Israeli reliance on UN which in present circumstance would weaken government's control of internal situation. In this connection, in line with request made to him in Washington that GOI use its efforts to enlist support of others, Ambassador Comay, formerly Israeli rep to United Nations, is embarking on visit several countries this morning. However, since GOI not fully informed as to exact state of play of consultations between US, UK and other governments and does not wish to cross any wires they are instructing Ambassador Harman to ascertain in Washington our ideas as to where and how Comay could make most useful contribution. Meanwhile, he is proceeding to the Netherlands since the Netherlands have already been in direct touch with GOI.
4. GOI does not of course anticipate that Security Council will be able to do anything effective to open Straits. It is relying on US-UK plan for international force to provide decisive capability.
5. Eban then remarked that crucial as the Straits issue is, even perhaps a more dangerous situation exists as a result of the confrontation of large Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Incidents there so far have been minor but a major clash could set off a conflagration at any time. In view of GOI best hope avoiding conflict that front is Soviets if they could persuade Nasser of necessity diminish tension by thinning out his concentrations. GOI would be more than happy to make parallel pullback. Eban hopes US going to bat with Sovs to this end.
6. Finally, Eban noted, while US and GOI intelligence estimates still considerably at variance but nevertheless Israelis prepared accept our conclusion that Egyptian attack not imminent, it impossible to rule out completely continued danger of full scale surprise attack by Nasser. It consequently essential everything possible be done to assure optimum US-Israeli posture in such an event. US had agreed to increase liaison in intelligence field, which being done. He had also discussed in Washington desirability of direct military liaison for contingency planning purposes and he wished reiterate importance GOI attaches to this matter.
7. Eban presented foregoing in measured non-emotional terms. It was remarked to me later by official also present that obviously Prime Minister and Eban have staked everything on assurances of support he obtained in Washington and there is considerable apprehension here that they may be optimistic in believing Nasser will give us time to follow scenario on which we have embarked. Same official also commented however that despite personal misgivings Chief of Staff Rabin is displaying firmest determination hold the hawks in line and strictly subject to political, that is Prime Minister's, orders.
Barbour
#####
Secret; Sensitive Memorandum of Conversation - US Support of Israel
Washington, May 30, 1967, 10 a.m.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files: FRC 330 71 A 4919, 333, Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on June 2. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. A typed notation on the memorandum indicates Hoopes saw it.
Net Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28055.htm
PARTICIPANTS
Israel
Brigadier General Joseph Geva, Israeli Defense Attach×™
Lt Col Moshe Amir, Assistant Israeli Defense Attach×™
United States
Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Director, Near East South Asia Region/2/
Philip E. Barringer, Deputy Director, NESA
Delavan P. Evans Assistant for Middle East Affairs, NESA
In the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
At his request, General Geva called to discuss US support of Israel in the present crisis. In essence, General Geva asked for a policy decision that the US would set aside previous policies and procedures and agree to far-reaching military cooperation and support of Israel in the light of the present crisis.
General Geva introduced the discussion by stating that Israel has accepted US advice about restraint, but when he left Mr. McNamara's office after the 26 May discussion with Foreign Minister Eban/3/ he was very worried. He focused on General Wheeler's statement that even after an initial UAR attack on Israeli airfields, Israel would win any war. General Geva agreed with that assessment but said Israel would pay a heavy penalty. General Geva was much concerned that in making its estimate the US was assuming that Israel had equipment and capabilities it does not have. General Geva further stated that four Presidents of the United States have made commitments to Israel. Israel does not expect US forces to intervene but wants to know whether it will be able to obtain "special assistance" from the US. General Geva also referred to President Johnson's statement to Foreign Minister Eban during a preceding trip to the effect that Israel was so strong that the Arabs would never attack, and to Mr. Hoopes' statements that the deterrent strength of the Israeli Defense Forces is a factor for peace in the area.
/3/See Document 69.
General Geva insisted that both Israel and the US have accepted a grave responsibility by restraint. He emphasized that Israel had nothing to gain by war. General Geva went on to indicate his concern with events in Jordan and stated that while he did not think the Soviet Union would interfere physically in the conflict it was supporting the Arab States diplomatically and with equipment.
General Geva stated it was his understanding that a "special relationship" between the US and Israel now exists. Under these circumstances he could not understand why Mr. McNamara had refused to loan Israel 150 to 200 thousand gas masks. Colonel Jordan explained that a loan might not be legal but that the US would supply the gas masks as soon as we could work out the necessary arrangements.
General Geva indicated that he foresaw problems with respect to military hardware. As examples, he mentioned the following:
(1) Israel is in the process of converting M-48A1 tanks to diesel-powered M-48A3's. This conversion process will take a year and a half, during which time these tanks are not available for operational use. Israel is now exploring the question of whether to request additional US tanks because of this difficulty.
(2) Israel had requested certain ECM equipment which had previously been refused. He asked whether it was necessary in this case to follow previous procedures (i.e., policies). Given the present "special relationship", he could not understand why the US seemed unwilling to release this equipment. (On at least one previous occasion Israel was refused ECM equipment on both policy and security grounds; the Senior Control Group recently decided to take no action on this ECM request for the time being since the time required to deliver and put this equipment in operation would be so long that it would not be useful in the present crisis.)
(3) Israel had asked that the USAF ship gas masks to Israel in Air Force C-130 aircraft but had been refused. General Geva felt that the "new approach" to Israel's problems should result in positive decisions on this kind of request. He foresaw that Israel would have serious financial and operational difficulties in transporting equipment to Israel in time to be useful during the present crisis.
Colonel Jordan indicated that he recognized the Israeli concern, but the issues General Geva was raising went far beyond the responsibilities of his Directorate. He would, however, take up these matters with Mr. Hoopes and Mr. McNamara. Colonel Jordan pointed out that the US has many interests in this crisis, one of which is to attempt to defuse the crisis. In his personal opinion it might make matters worse if the USAF were to deliver equipment in C-130 aircraft since such action might send the wrong signal to the other side. It was important for the US to maintain its ability to take the heat out of the situation by diplomacy and to stave off a conflict.
General Geva then took up the problem of US support of Israel's position with respect to the Gulf of Aqaba and possible US military support of Israel. He stated that in the present crisis the US is surely not neutral. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles had given commitments with respect to freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. He referred to written assurances by Secretary Dulles and statements by Ambassador Lodge in early 1957. He also stated that Nasser seems to consider that Israel is isolated and is therefore playing all of his cards. It is important that Nasser understand that Israel is not isolated, and that the US in effect is supporting Israel's position.
An informal discussion of the US position and problems ensued. In general, DoD spokesmen pressed the ideas that we have interests in other countries in the area such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan; that the US is in a very difficult position which requires that it maintain flexibility. Maintaining flexibility may preclude overt, massive aid. If we can carry through with some influence in the Arab world, we may be able to achieve a settlement which will protect not only US interests throughout the area but also the long-range interests of Israel.
General Geva raised the question of combined contingency planning. He foresaw a situation in which Hussein might be overthrown or for some other reason the US would consider it necessary to intervene with military forces. He pressed the thought that combined planning after a decision had been made to undertake joint action would not work. Would it not be better therefore to undertake discussions and possibly combined planning at an early date?
General Geva indicated that despite the President's commitments to closer cooperation with Israel in defense and intelligence fields, the Israelis were finding that these commitments were being construed narrowly by those given the responsibility for carrying them out. Colonel Jordan indicated that he understood the point General Geva was making but that these matters were far beyond the responsibility of his Directorate. However, General Geva's views would be made known to the proper authorities.
Colonel Jordan went on to reemphasize the fact that the US is involved in a very delicate situation. People at all levels including Secretaries McNamara and Rusk are wrestling with these problems and are making plans. These also involve the UK and other maritime countries. The President also wished to have consultations with Congress, which will take time. Colonel Jordan expressed the opinion that when these matters have reached an appropriate point he felt sure that discussions with Israel would be undertaken. At the moment we are most concerned that these efforts, which were of interest both to Israel and the US, not be jeopardized by hostilities.
####
Elbit Systems Awarded Contracts to Supply Elop's Lightweight Thermal Imagers to the Canadian and Israeli Armed Forces as well as other Customers Worldwide, at a total value of approximately $50 million
Source: http://www.elbitsystems.com/data/ESLT_TI_CAN_ISR_AF.pdf
Further Reading: http://www.elbitsystems.com/productsInnerPage.asp?n_Family=27
Haifa, Israel, May 29, 2007 – Elbit Systems Ltd. (NASDAQ: ESLT) announced that its subsidiary Elbit Systems Electro-Optics Elop Ltd. ("Elop") has been awarded several contracts valued at a total of approximately $50 million to supply hand-held Thermal Imaging systems to the Canadian and Israeli armed forces as well as for additional customers worldwide.
"Elop's advanced hand-held Thermal Imaging systems are part of the CORAL family of products. They combine advanced capabilities and high performance with compactness and low energy consumption, providing a considerable advantage to infantry forces," said Elop’s General Manager, Haim Rousso.
"These orders, that follow other recent contract awards around the globe, further establish our position as a market leader in advanced Thermal Imaging systems optimized for the modern battlefield."
The hand-held night vision Thermal Imaging system is lightweight (less than 2.5 kg) and is carried by an infantry soldier on a neck-strap. The system enables the user to view targets at night at tactical ranges, from either fixed positions or while in motion.
About Elbit Systems Electro-Optics Elop Ltd.
Elbit Systems Electro-Optics Elop Ltd. (Elop) is a globally recognized multidisciplinary electro-optics systems house – incorporating the full range of related technology and facilities under one roof. Elop entered the field of Thermal Imaging systems in the 1970s and has produced and supplied thousands of Thermal Imaging systems to the most demanding military organizations and defense industries worldwide, employing the latest thermal imaging technologies for use in almost all known military night vision applications.
About Elbit Systems Ltd.
Elbit Systems Ltd. is an international defense electronics company engaged in a wide range of defense-related programs throughout the world. The Elbit Systems Group, which includes the company and its subsidiaries, operates in the areas of aerospace, land and naval systems, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ("C4ISR"), advanced electro-optic and space technologies, EW suites, airborne warning systems, ELINT systems, data links and military communications systems and equipment.
The Group also focuses on the upgrading of existing military platforms and developing new technologies for defense and homeland security applications.
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PM Meets with US House Democracy Assistance Commission
Source: Prime Minister's Media Adviser
Prime Minister Olmert today (Wednesday), 30.5.07, met with four members of the US House of Representatives Democracy Assistance Commission ( http://hdac.house.gov ; Rep. David Price, D-NC; Rep. Jeff Fortenberry, R-NE; Nick Rahall, D-WV; and Gwen Moore, D-WI) and with US Ambassador to Israel Richard Jones. The commission members have been visiting countries that aspire to have stable parliaments and democratic systems and to this end have visited Lebanon.
The PM briefed his guests on the Palestinian situation and described in detail the resolve of the residents of Sderot and the other communities adjacent to the Gaza Strip in light of the continuing Kassam rocket fire ( http://tinyurl.com/39azfb ).
The PM emphasized: "We cannot show restraint forever. Israel showed restraint for six months in the face of rocket fire but the Palestinians have not stopped the firing even for one day." The Prime Minister said that he intended to meet Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abu Mazen next week in order to stress the partnership with PA moderates. "We expect more responsibility from the Palestinian side and the creation of an environment that is conducive to dialogue with moderate Palestinians," the Prime Minister said.
On the Lebanese issue, Olmert emphasized that there was no territorial dispute between Israel and Lebanon and added that from Israel's point-of-view, the situation was better than it has been previously. "The deployment of the Lebanese Army in the south and the activity of UN forces have led to quiet in the entire area. This is a tangible result of the fighting last summer," the PM said.
Olmert clarified Israel's position regarding the Arab initiative (http://tinyurl.com/27ztoz ): "We see a tangible change in the Arab position by virtue of the fact that 22 Arab countries are looking for a way to make peace with Israel, not war." However, the PM also emphasized that it was impossible to hold serious negotiations as long as rockets were falling on Israeli citizens on a daily basis.
On the Syrian issue, Olmert reiterated that while he was interested in making peace with Syria ( http://tinyurl.com/22xkll ), it seems that the current Syrian regime, which supports terrorism, is uninterested in reaching an agreement.
####
PM Meets with European Parliament Pres. Hans-Gert Pottering
Source: (Communicated by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser)
Prime Minister Olmert today (Wednesday), 30.5.07, met with European Parliament President Hans-Gert Pottering. The two men discussed at length the situation in the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the continued firing from the Gaza Strip at Israeli residents in the communities adjacent to it ( http://tinyurl.com/39azfb ).
Olmert emphasized that he would not transfer funds to the PA as long as there were concerns that the funds would be used for terrorism. "The idea that Israel will unfreeze funds that will be used for terrorist activity against us is unacceptable," the PM said.
Olmert referred to the continuing psychological trauma of the children in the area and noted that it was his responsibility to see to it that Israeli children do not live under the daily threat of rockets.
The two men also discussed ways to improve the situation of the residents of the Gaza Strip and the possibility of industrial development in the Gaza Strip. The PM emphasized his willingness but explained that investors will not invest in areas controlled by terrorists.
Top Tanzim terror operatives arrested in Shchem
Source: IDF & Security Sources
In an Israeli security forces operation in Shchem (Nablus) early this morning, May
29th 2007, the forces arrested four senior wanted terror operatives from Tanzim, the military arm of the Chairman Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah organization. The forces uncovered three handguns in the building where the three were staying. The four were involved in bombings and shooting attacks against Israelis in which civilians were killed and injured, and belong to a terrorist infrastructure guided and funded by Hezbollah.
· Jamal Abdel Hamid Mohammad Tirawi, 41, is a senior Tanzim terrorist in Shchem, one of the heads of Palestinian General Intelligence in Shchem and a member of the Fatah Legislative Council. Tirawi is involved in directing and dispatching terrorists for attacks, including the suicide bomber who exploded himself at the Bialik Cafe in Tel Aviv in March 2002, killing an Israeli woman and injuring 29 others. Additionally, Tirawi recruited operatives for Tanzim, dealt in weaponry and supplied arms to
Tanzim cells in Shchem.
· Rabiah Farid Mousah Abu Lil, 25, a member of Tirawi's cell, is involved in shooting and bombing attacks. He is suspected of involvement in the killing of an IDF officer in late May 2005 during an operation in the Balata R.C. and in the shooting attack near the Israeli community of Migdalim in January 2005 in which two soldiers were killed and another was injured.
· Najeh Salim Atiah Abu Shahin, 35, is involved in directing and executing attacks against Israelis, including the previously mentioned attack near Migdalim.
· Faras Mohammad Hassan Rian, 24, is involved in shooting and bombing attacks, including a shooting attack in which an IDF soldier was wounded during an operation in the Balata R.C.
####
Security Forces Arrest Four Wanted Senior Terrorists
Source: Official IDF Statement
Wednesday 30/05/2007 16:22
IDF forces operate in Nablus. Archive Photo: IDF Spokesperson
During a joint IDF and GSA forces operations last night, four wanted Tanzim organization terrorists were arrested in Nablus. During the arrest, which took place at the Balata refugee camp, the forces uncovered three guns in the possession of the wanted terrorists.
The arrested terrorists are Jamal Abed El-Hamid, a 41 year old member of the Fatah organization legislative committee, and one of the organization's intelligence heads. El-Hamid was responsible for a terror attack at Cafe Bialik in Tel Aviv on March 2002, which killed an Israeli civilian and wounded 29 additional civilians.
The second arrested terrorist is Mussa Abu Lil, 25 years old, who was the suspect of the murder of Major Shachar Ben Yishai, may he rest in peace, during an operation in the Balata refugee camp in May 2005.
In addition, the security forces arrested Salim Atia, 35, who was said to be involved in many terror attacks, including the attack on the Trans-Samaria Highway in January 2005, and Firas Mahmed Hassan, 24, who was involved in the shooting attack in the Balata refugee camp which left one soldier wounded.
The four detainees are wanted members of the Tanzim terror organization in Nablus. The Nablus cell received instructions and finances from the Hezbollah terror organization with the aim of executing terror attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians.
####
IDF Updated Reports
(09:12 30/05/2007)
Now released for publication: overnight an IDF force arrested the Tanzim terror organization head in the village of Beit Iba, northwest of Nablus, Haled Ramadan Taufik Ismail.
(08:36 27/05/2007)
IDF soldiers arrested two wanted Palestinians in Bethlehem.
(08:33 27/05/2007)
Palestinians opened fire at IDF troops operating in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus. No injuries or damage was reported.
####
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s Speech at the Knesset
Translation
29/05/2007
Source: http://www.pmo.gov.il/NR/exeres/F94A808B-1C9F-4978-AB52-248A9485011D,frameless.htm?NRMODE=Published
Madam Speaker,
Members of Knesset,
Allow me to begin at the end: there are no easy wars, as there are no victories without cost. Any decision to go to war, even the clearest and most unmistakable – is never easy, and anyone who says otherwise is either not telling the truth or is heartless. Neither exhilaration nor the heat of battle filled me when we embarked on the Second Lebanon War. However, I believed then, as I believe now, that it was the necessary and imperative decision under the circumstances.
It is true that the Second Lebanon War, like all the wars fought to date, exacted a heavy cost. It is part of the heavy cost paid by the State of Israel for six decades of its desire to live in peace, security and independence. This cost, the lives of soldiers and civilians, cannot be quantified or measured, because there is no price for the pain of a bereaved mother, there is no measure for the grief of the father who has lost his son, and there is no going rate for orphanhood. And I see them – the mothers, fathers, siblings, children and wives – entire families, engulfed in despair, arriving in my office weekly, for heartrending conversations.
To all those who are attempting to sow frustration in addition to the grief, I say emphatically: the cost in blood was not in vain. It is my duty to say this again and again to the families. Two weeks ago, I visited the northern border. I was, inter alia, in Shlomi and Arab al Aramshe – in each location they showed me the positions in which Hezbollah terrorists used to sit. Every morning, residents would open their windows and see across from their homes, during every hour and minute, tens or hundreds of meters away, Hezbollah members aiming the barrel of their guns at them.
This is no longer true.
My Government had goals when embarking on the campaign. The goals of the fighting, as defined in advance, were the realization of UN Resolution 1559; pushing Hezbollah back from the border; the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the south; a total cease-fire; and the return of the kidnapped soldiers. There are those who criticized and defined the final demand as ambitious and unrealistic. This is, indeed, true; we knew that the chances of returning the kidnapped soldiers, Udi Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, in a military operation were very low. This did not stop us from initiating and implementing bold steps towards this end during the fighting. The things we said in this regard also had a clear purpose. We could not expect the UN, the G8 Summit and the Rome Commission to place the return of the soldiers as their top concern if we ourselves had not declared that it was our top concern.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Members of Knesset,
Since the publication of the Winograd Commission Report, our public space has been filled with an unending cacophony. From amidst the din, a number of voices arose – not from the shrill and inflammatory vein – who have analyzed the situation from a broad international and historic view. Thus, for example, I heard the statement from Prof. Martin van Creveld of the history department of the Hebrew University, who examined the results of the Second Lebanon War in depth. According to the professor, the nine months since the war have been the longest period of quiet experienced by Israel on its northern border since 1968. He determined that the goal of fundamentally changing the situation in the north was achieved. During 2000-2006, incidents would occur every three to four months, on average, and since the implementation of Resolution 1701, quiet has been maintained.
Members of Knesset, the situation in South Lebanon has completely changed. An echo of this was heard in the statement made by the commander of the UNIFIL forces in South Lebanon, General Claudio Graziano. “I would like the Israelis to understand that the situation in Lebanon has changed. There is a different UNIFIL, a new one,” he said. “The population in South Lebanon understands that the situation has fundamentally changed. There are no Hezbollah outposts – only posters and flags here and there. Italian and French tanks patrol the area. This is the quietest period in South Lebanon in over 40 years.” General Graziano reports that UNIFIL Forces so far have found several hundred bunkers which existed before the war. Today, there are no new missiles south of the Litani River.
The world also views the war as having brought about strategic accomplishments for Israel. One of the most highly esteemed commentators in international journalism, Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, who published an article following the interim report of the Winograd Commission, wrote that, as a result of Israeli actions, Nasrallah diminished the deterrence capability of his organization, as well as Iran’s and Syria’s. “When the war started, Hezbollah’s fighters were sitting right on the border with Israel… [and were] a real threat to Israel. As a result of the war, Hezbollah was pushed off the border by Israel and, it its place, the UN inserted a new peacekeeping force… [This is] a huge strategic loss for Hezbollah.” Friedman ends his article by writing, “Today, less than a year after [the war], Lebanon is weaker and Israel is stronger. That’s what matters. And that is why, if the Hezbollah leader had any honor, he would resign.”
So what is happening to us? I see the frustration, hear the voices of desperation, feel the sense of bitterness, and am very troubled about this. Perhaps, as one of the members of the Winograd Commission said, “The reason we are sitting here today is the large gap in the consciousness of the Israeli public in relation to the level of injury inflicted on the Hezbollah and the illusory victory of Hezbollah as a small guerilla organization.”
From where does this obsessive insistence to present a negative picture in shades of just black emanate? The Winograd Commission did determine that in the functioning of all those who made decisions during the war there were also many impressive examples of dedication, investment, ability to analyze, effort, decision-making ability and the acceptance of responsibility.
Madam Speaker,
Members of Knesset,
Anyone who really cares about the implementation of the Winograd Report should read it in its entirety – the good and the bad. One should not search for what is not in it and transform that into a political guillotine. It should not be studied in terms of the political race of those who are in a hurry to grab control, even at the cost of groundless self-destruction, reason and limits. All this about a war which was wholly justified.
It is true that there were mistakes and failures, some outlined during the war, some built into the system, some which dragged on for years. The report points them all out in a keen and clear manner. You asked me to report here tonight in order to discuss the conclusions. As much as I respect the need of some of the Members here to speak, argue and primarily attack, my Government has, since publication of the report, been busy. The members of the Winograd Commission explained that they submitted an interim report, before completing their work, because they saw the urgency of correcting any shortcomings. Anyone with eyes in their head understood that the Commission was saying “yes” to correcting shortcomings and “no” to beheadings. And to those who have yet to internalize this, these things are clearly written in the report, even while the Commission criticizes our tendency as a society and country to equate treatment of substantial and burning issues with lopping off heads.
The Government respected the business-like attitude of the Commission, rolled up its sleeves and embarked on implementation:
• The IDF is currently in a period of unusual activity, and we are closely monitoring the implementation of the lessons – in training, exercises, and equipment at the general staff level and in the field. We cannot return to the situation in which the commander of a Nahal battalion who has served in his position for two years, comes to me and tells me that his first battalion exercise took place during battle in Lebanon.
• A significant portion of the Commission’s recommendations are already being implemented, also in the manner in which the Government and Cabinet function.
• Last Thursday, the steering team for implementation of the Commission’s conclusions, headed by former Chief of General Staff, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, commenced working. In accordance with my instructions, the team should complete its work as soon as possible.
Now is the time for corrections – and allow me to calm those who are in such a rush by saying that the time for personal accounting will come.
Allow me to add a number of things on a personal note.
I did not come here to fight – not with you, Members of Knesset, nor with anyone else. I wish to say something to the Israeli people, to the residents of the North, to bereaved families who lost their children on the home front and on the frontlines, to the wounded soldiers and to the families of the kidnapped soldiers: I am proud of the decision of the Government of Israel on July 12 to respond strongly and with force, in light of the kidnapping of Udi and Eldad, the killing of eight of our soldiers and the firing of missiles at the northern communities. We did not always react in this way. In a number of incidents in the past, we restrained ourselves. We held back. On July 12, we decided – no more. It was a just, unavoidable and correct response.
In a number of discussions over several months, I soundly considered our pattern of response long before it took place. I discussed it. I presented the recommendations of the security forces to the Government, and after hearing all the details, the entire Government voted unanimously in favor of a strong Israeli response, and even approved the committee draft which defined the targets of Israeli response.
Indeed, I formulated my stance at the end of a series of ongoing discussions which began the day I took on the responsibility of governing the country at the beginning of January 2006. It is true, on July 12 my position was formulated, and I did not rush to make decisions solely based on the events of that day. This is how one should behave. It was my duty to behave thus.
My fellow Members of Knesset,
I clearly remember the backup provided by a vast majority of this house to the Government Resolution of July 12. You too were correct. At the time, you stood, one after the other, and saluted the Government’s steps, its duty to respond, even with the knowledge that this response would lead to vulnerability on the Israeli home front – at the time, that was the best response.
I appreciated and respected the determined response of the Opposition head, Benjamin Netanyahu, who was invited to see me on the evening of July 12. As I was obliged to do, I provided the head of the Opposition with a detailed, full and comprehensive update regarding the Government’s discussion, its decision, the Israeli response expected that night and its specific goals. Mr. Netanyahu told me that I had his full and unconditional support for these decisions. He would do the same, he told me. On July 26 as well, two weeks after the beginning of the campaign, and just 10 days after the period examined by the Winograd Commission, I won the wall-to-wall support of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset. At the time, Mr. Netanyahu said the following: “I stand behind the goals set out by the Cabinet. I determine that they are deserving goals, and their accomplishment should be supported. I congratulate the tremendous accomplishment: the statement of the G8 countries”. There is no doubt that the support of the head of the Opposition was an important boon to the general attitude of the public to the war.
There were some members of the Opposition who criticized me at the time. Some of them thought that the Israeli response against the Hezbollah was not strong enough – that it should be expanded to other groups. All those who supported and all those who criticized should be thanked – even if there are a few among the members of the Opposition who today tend to forget their position during those same days, and ask for my resignation for those exact same decisions they backed up and encouraged. I will not forget how, during those difficult days, they acted responsibly. This means something in this place.
As I conclude, but not as a side note, I would like to refer to the disturbing phenomenon, in the wake of the publication of the Winograd Commission interim report, of attacking the IDF. Under no circumstances and conditions will I be dragged into the critical spirit of attacking IDF soldiers, its fighters and commanders, past or present. They are the backbone of our force. They are the basis of our strength. They are the source of our pride. We love the IDF, its fighters and commanders, all of them, and will continue to embrace them and honor them.
Distinguished Members of Knesset,
On the first day of fighting, upon conclusion of the fighting and ever since, I said: the supreme responsibility is the Government’s, and first and foremost, mine, as its head. I have not changed my stance; I did not shirk responsibility; I did not avoid its consequences.
I admit the full scope of responsibility, for failures, shortcomings and omissions as well as for the great accomplishments. Based on all these insights – my Government will continue to lead the people of Israel to security, well-being, prosperity, national reconciliation and – with G-d’s help – to peace as well.
Al-Aqsa Brigades shoot two "collaborators" in the legs in NablusDate: 30 / 05 / 2007 Time: 10:41
Source: http://www.maannews.net/en/index.php?opr=ShowDetails&ID=22499
Photo Credit: Maan News
Nablus - Ma'an - The Al-Aqsa Brigades, the main armed wing of Fatah, shot two alleged "collaborators" in the legs in the centre of Nablus in the northern West Bank very early on Wednesday morning. The two Palestinians are accused of collaborating with the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian West Bank.
A spokesperson of the brigades told Ma'an via telephone that the collaborators admitted to the charges against them during interrogation.
The incident took place in a square in the centre of the city in the very early morning, soon after midnight. The brigades' spokesperson explained that the incident was meant to deter other people who might even think of collaboration with the Israeli military occupation.
The brigades threatened that they would strike anyone who might be proved to be cooperating with the Israeli occupation because, according to the brigades, the collaborators played a major role in the recent Israeli targeted killing campaign against Palestinian activists.
The spokesperson of the brigades pledged to distribute to media outlets a cassette containing the collaborators' confession to the charges.
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Brigades launch ten mortars at Kfar Aza
Date: 30 / 05 / 2007 Time: 20:38
Source: http://www.maannews.net/en/index.php?opr=ShowDetails&ID=22529
Gaza - Ma'an – The An Nasser Salah Addin Brigades of the Popular Resistance Committees, along with the Islamic and national resistance brigades, have declared their responsibility for the launching of ten mortar projectiles at Kfar 'Aza on Wednesday.
A joint statement issued declared that the brigades launched the projectiles "as retaliation for the Israeli killing and assassination operations in the territories."
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Islamic Jihad's military wing fire projectiles at Sderot and other targets
Date: 30 / 05 / 2007 Time: 14:33
Gaza - Ma'an - The Al-Quds Brigades, the armed wing of Islamic Jihad, claimed responsibility on Wednesday for launching 4 homemade projectiles at the southern Israeli town of Sderot and other residential compounds east of the southern Gaza Strip.
The brigades said in a statement that the shelling was part of a series of operations to come in retaliation for the Israeli policy of "targeted killings" against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
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Brigades linked to Fatah and the Popular Resistance Committees fire projectiles at Netiv Ha'asarah and Sderot
Date: 30 / 05 / 2007 Time: 09:31
Gaza - Ma'an - The An Nasser Salah Addin Brigades, the armed wing of the Popular Resistance Committees, and the Al-Aqsa Brigades, the main armed wing of Fatah, claimed responsibility on Tuesday night for launching one homemade projectile at the Israeli village of Netiv Ha'asarah, located just north of the Gaza Strip.
The Al-Aqsa Brigades also claimed responsibility on Wednesday morning for firing four homemade projectiles at the southern Israeli towns of Sderot and Netiv Ha'asarah.
The brigades said in a joint statement that the joint operation on Tuesday night came in retaliation for the assassination of the leader of the Fatah-affiliated Abu Ammar Brigades in Jenin, Muhammad Mer'i, on Tuesday evening, and the killing of two of Hamas' Al-Qassam Brigades' activists, Abdul Karim Sha'ath and Muhammad Mu'ammar, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on Tuesday morning.
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Al Quds Brigades fire three mortar projectiles at an Israeli military post in central Gaza Strip
Date: 30 / 05 / 2007 Time: 16:25
Gaza - Ma'an - The Al Quds Brigades, the armed wing of Islamic Jihad, have claimed responsibility for launching three mortar projectiles on Wednesday at noon at an Israeli military post located east of Juhor Ad-Dik in the central Gaza Strip.
In a statement, the brigades said that "the operation came as part of their retaliation for the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people in the territories."
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Palestinian NGOs reveal rising rates of so-called 'honour killings'
Date: 28 / 05 / 2007 Time: 18:43
Source: http://www.maannews.net/en/index.php?opr=ShowDetails&ID=22441
Ramallah - Ma'an - A forum of Palestinian organizations which fight anti-women violence published on Monday a report about killing Palestinian women under the guise of so-called family honour. The report covered 3 years from 2004 to 2006.
The report shows that the average number of women killed for challenging patriarchal norms increased from 14 incidents to 32 in one year. The organisation reported that the youngest case which they dealt with was that of a 12 year old girl and the oldest was that of an 85 year old woman. 32 out of 48 reported cases were documented formally as murder on the basis of family honour.
According to the report, from these 32 reported cases of 'honour killing', 30 of the murdered girls were Muslim. Of these 30 Muslim victims, 14 were unmarried, 8 were married, 6 were divorced and 2 were widows. Half of the victims were in the Gaza Strip and the rest were in the West Bank. Villages recorded the highest rate of murder of women.
The report also shows that the murder of 'dishonourable' women was committed in numerous ways ranging from stabbing to suffocating to poisoning.
In 17 cases, the perpetrators were brothers, while in 5 cases the fathers killed their own daughters.
The report also affirmed that real figures are very hard to attain for several reasons: the lack of formal statistics; the lack of reporting of such cases and the legal closure of many cases in the name of fate and destiny.
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Al-Buraq Army shoot at settlers near Nablus
Date: 28 / 05 / 2007 Time: 16:28
Source: http://www.maannews.net/en/index.php?opr=ShowDetails&ID=22433
Nablus – Ma'an – The Al-Buraq Army, which is affiliated to the Al-Aqsa Brigades of Fatah, on Monday morning claimed responsibility for shooting at an Israeli settler car near Nablus, in the northern West Bank.
The spokesperson of the Al-Aqsa Brigades, Abu Fuad, told Ma'an via telephone that a group of activists from the Buraq Army opened fire at a settler car near the Israeli settlement of Shave Shomeron.
The Al-Buraq Army announced in a statement that their fighters hit the car occupants directly.
They also stated that the operation is "a natural retaliation to Israeli atrocities."
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Berlin, Germany, 30 May 2007
Statement of the Quartet, as read by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
Source: http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2592
The Quartet Principals -- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, High Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner - met today in Berlin to discuss the situation in the Middle East.
The Quartet expressed its deep concern over recent factional violence in Gaza. It called for all Palestinians to immediately renounce all acts of violence and respect the ceasefire. It called upon the Palestinian Authority government, in cooperation with President Abbas and regional actors, to do everything necessary to restore law and order, including the release of kidnapped BBC journalist Alan Johnston.
The Quartet strongly condemned the continued firing of Qassam rockets into Southern Israel as well as the buildup of arms by Hamas and other terrorist groups in Gaza.
It endorsed PA President Abbas' call for an immediate end to such violence, and called upon all elements of the PA government and all Palestinian groups to cooperate with President Abbas to that end. The Quartet called for the immediate and unconditional release of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit. The Quartet urged Israel to exercise restraint to ensure that its security operations avoid civilian casualties or damage to civilian infrastructure. It noted that the detention of elected members of the Palestinian government and legislature raises particular concerns and called for them to be released. The Quartet noted its support for the May 30th Security Council Press Statement on the breakdown of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
The Quartet welcomed continued dialogue between Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas, including bilateral summits, and expressed support for U.S. efforts to effect progress on security and movement and access issues. The Quartet agreed that movement and access are essential and in this regard called on both parties to implement fully the Movement and Access Agreement of 15 November 2005. The Quartet urged the parties to work positively and constructively in order to build confidence and to create an environment conducive to progress on the political horizon for Palestinian statehood, consistent with the Roadmap and relevant UN Security Council resolutions, which should also be addressed in these bilateral discussions. Palestinians must know that their state will be viable, and Israelis must know a future state of Palestine will be a source of security, not a threat.
The Quartet commended the excellent work of the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) and endorsed its extension for three months from July until September 2007. It called on donors to follow through on past pledges of support. The Quartet noted that the resumption of transfers of tax and customs revenues collected by Israel on behalf of the Palestinian Authority would have a significant impact on the Palestinian economy.
The Quartet encouraged Israel and the Palestinian Authority to consider resumption of such transfers via the Temporary International Mechanism to improve the economic and humanitarian conditions in the West Bank and Gaza. In light of increased regional support for the Palestinians, the Quartet agreed to review where additional donor assistance should be focused, with particular consideration for infrastructure and development programmes that can directly improve the daily lives of Palestinians. The Quartet invited concrete proposals from the parties on specific international support that could be useful at this stage.
The Quartet welcomed the extension of the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EU-BAM). It reiterated the importance of resuming normal operations at the Rafah crossing.
Taking note of the continuing threat to Israeli and Palestinian security posed by smuggling, the Quartet welcomed progress in the Quadrilateral Security Committee and called for greater efforts by all parties to improve security along the Egypt-Gaza border.
The Quartet welcomed the re-affirmation of the Arab Peace Initiative, noting that the initiative is recognized in the Roadmap as a vital element of international efforts to advance regional peace. The Arab Peace Initiative provides a welcome regional political horizon for Israel, complementing the efforts of the Quartet and of the parties themselves to advance towards negotiated, comprehensive, just and lasting peace.
The Quartet noted its positive meeting with members of the Arab League in Sharm al-Sheikh on May 4, and looked forward to continued engagement with the Arab states. It welcomed the intention of the Arab League to engage Israel on the initiative, and Israeli receptiveness to such engagement. Recalling elements of the April 18 decision by the Arab League Follow-up Committee, the Quartet urged all involved to demonstrate their seriousness and commitment to making peace. In that context, the Quartet reiterated the need for a Palestinian Government committed to nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap, and reaffirmed its willingness to support such a government.
The Quartet encouraged continued and expanded Arab contacts with Israel, and Israeli action to address concerns raised in the April 18 Arab League decision, including a cessation of settlement expansion and the removal of illegal outposts, as called for in the Roadmap.
Looking ahead, the Quartet discussed a calendar for the coming months to support and encourage progress on the bilateral and regional tracks. The Quartet principals agreed to meet in the region in June with the Israelis and Palestinians to review progress and discuss the way forward.
The Quartet also agreed to meet in the region with members of the Arab League to follow up on the Arab Peace Initiative and efforts to advance the regional track. Principals instructed the envoys to meet beforehand to follow up and explore options for the way forward.
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SECURITY COUNCIL PRESS STATEMENT ON BREAKDOWN OF CEASEFIRE IN GAZA STRIP
Source: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9028.doc.htm
The following Security Council press statement on the breakdown of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip was delivered today by Council President Zalmay Khalilzad ( United States):
The members of the Security Council expressed their grave concern at the breakdown of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the resulting increase in violence. The members welcomed the efforts of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to establish a ceasefire, and expressed appreciation for the active support of the Government of Egypt in this regard. They urged all parties to join the members of the Council in supporting the call of President Abbas for an immediate end to the violence.
3857. 1. In hour long meeting at his request Eban reviewed to me developments to date and Israelis' current concerns and ideas as to next steps.
