Thursday, January 29, 2009

I Am the Soldier Who Slept In Your Home



An Open Letter to A citizen Of Gaza: I Am the Soldier Who Slept In Your Home:
By: Yishai G (reserve soldier) ygoldflam@gmail.com

[Originally published in Hebrew in Maariv]

Hello,

While the world watches the ruins in Gaza, you return to your home which remains standing. However, I am sure that it is clear to you that someone
was in your home while you were away.

I am that someone.

I spent long hours imagining how you would react when you walked into your home. How you would feel when you understood that IDF soldiers had slept on your mattresses and used your blankets to keep warm.

I knew that it would make you angry and sad and that you would feel this violation of the most intimate areas of your life by those defined as your enemies, with stinging humiliation. I am convinced that you hate me with unbridled hatred, and you do not have even the tiniest desire to hear what I have to say. At the same time, it is important for me to say the following in the hope that there is even the minutest chance that you will hear me.

I spent many days in your home. You and your family's presence was felt in every corner. I saw your family portraits on the wall, and I thought of my family. I saw your wife's perfume bottles on the bureau, and I thought of my wife. I saw
your children's toys and their English language schoolbooks. I saw your personal computer and how you set up the modem and wireless phone next to the screen, just as I do.

I wanted you to know that despite the immense disorder you found in your house that was created during a search for explosives and tunnels (which were indeed found in other homes), we did our best to treat your possessions with respect. When I moved the computer table, I disconnected the cables and lay them down neatly on the floor, as I would do with my own computer. I even covered the computer from dust with a piece of cloth. I tried to put back the clothes that fell when we moved the closet although not the same as you would have done, but at least in such a way that nothing would get lost.

I know that the devastation, the bullet holes in your walls and the destruction of those homes near you place my descriptions in a ridiculous light. Still, I need you to understand me, us, and hope that you will channel your anger and criticism to the right places.

I decided to write you this letter specifically because I stayed in your home.

I can surmise that you are intelligent and educated and there are those in your household that are university students. Your children learn English, and you are connected to the Internet. You are not ignorant; you know what is going on around you.

Therefore, I am sure you know that Qassam rockets were launched from your neighborhood into Israeli towns and cities.

How could you see these weekly launches and not think that one day we would say "enough"?! Did you ever consider that it is perhaps wrong to launch rockets at innocent civilians trying to lead a normal life, much like you? How long did you think we would sit back without reacting?

I can hear you saying "it's not me, it's Hamas". My intuition tells me you are not their most avid supporter. If you look closely at the sad reality in which your people live, and you do not try to deceive yourself or make excuses about "occupation", you must certainly reach the conclusion that the Hamas is your real enemy.

The reality is so simple, even a seven year old can understand: Israel withdrew from the Gaza strip, removing military bases and its citizens from Gush Katif. Nonetheless, we continued to provide you with electricity, water, and goods (and this I know very well as during my reserve duty I guarded the border crossings more than once, and witnessed hundreds of trucks full of goods entering a blockade-free Gaza every day).

Despite all this, for reasons that cannot be understood and with a lack of any rational logic, Hamas launched missiles on Israeli towns. For three years we clenched our teeth and restrained ourselves. In the end, we could not take it anymore and entered the Gaza strip, into your neighborhood, in order to remove those who want to kill us. A reality that is painful but very easy to explain.

As soon as you agree with me that Hamas is your enemy and because of them, your people are miserable, you will also understand that the change must come from within. I am acutely aware of the fact that what I say is easier
to write than to do, but I do not see any other way. You, who are connected to the world and concerned about your children's education, must lead, together with your friends, a civil uprising against Hamas.

I swear to you, that if the citizens of Gaza were busy paving roads, building schools, opening factories and cultural institutions instead of dwelling in self pity, arms smuggling and nurturing a hatred to your Israeli neighbors, your homes would not be in ruins right now. If your leaders were not corrupt and motivated by hatred, your home would not have been harmed. If someone would have stood up and shouted that there is no point in launching missiles on innocent civilians, I would not have to stand in your kitchen as a soldier.

You don't have money, you tell me? You have more than you can imagine.

Even before Hamas took control of Gaza, during the time of Yasser Arafat, millions if not billions of dollars donated by the world community to the Palestinians was used for purchasing arms or taken directly to your leaders bank accounts. Gulf States, the emirates - your brothers, your flesh and blood, are some of the richest nations in the world. If there was even a small feeling of solidarity between Arab nations, if these nations had but the smallest interest in reconstructing the Palestinian people - your situation would be very different.

You must be familiar with Singapore. The land mass there is not much larger than the Gaza strip and it is considered to be the second most populated country in the world. Yet, Singapore is a successful, prospering, and well managed country. Why not the same for you?

My friend, I would like to call you by name, but I will not do so publicly.

I want you to know that I am 100% at peace with what my country did, what my army did, and what I did. However, I feel your pain. I am sorry for the destruction you are finding in your neighborhood at this moment. On a personal level, I did what I could to minimize the damage to your home as much as possible.

In my opinion, we have a lot more in common than you might imagine. I am a civilian, not a soldier, and in my private life I have nothing to do with the military. However, I have an obligation to leave my home, put on a uniform, and protect my family every time we are attacked. I have no desire to be in your home wearing a uniform again and I would be more than happy to sit with you as a guest on your beautiful balcony, drinking sweet tea seasoned with the sage growing in your garden.

The only person who could make that dream a reality is you. Take responsibility for yourself, your family, your people, and start to take control of your destiny. How? I do not know. Maybe there is something to be learned from the Jewish people who rose up from the most destructive human tragedy of the 20th century, and instead of sinking into self-pity, built a flourishing and prospering country. It is possible, and it is in your hands. I am ready to be there to provide a shoulder of support and help to you.

But only you can move the wheels of history.

Regards,

Yishai, (Reserve Soldier)



Saturday, January 24, 2009

Lieutenant-General Gabi Ashkenazi: Commander in Chief




Leading by example, shying away from the media and avoiding taking a public stand, IDF Chief Gabi Ashkenazi has done everything he can to become the antithesis of his predecessor

Amir Shoan and Amira Lam - YNet

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Gabi Ashkenazi is Israeli society's new consensus de jour. A man who enjoys public admiration not seen, it seems, since Yitzhak Rabin led the IDF and Israel to victory in the Six Day War.

Though hailed for his part in Operation Cast Lead, history will probably remember Ashkenazi, 54, first and foremost as the man who took over from Dan Halutz.

Last week, unbeknown to anyone, Ashkenazi drove down to the Gaza Strip. Even IDF Spokesman Brigadier-General Avi Benayahu was kept out of the loop. Normally, such a visit would make headlines and be accompanied by scores of shutterbugs, but not this time. The Israeli offensive in Gaza has Ashkenazi preoccupied with things other than public relations.

The Friday before the ground incursion into the Strip Ashkenazi drove south, gathered the troops and briefed them on the situation. He was assured that the change he has been trying to introduce in the army since he took office was indeed taking hold, when the senior officers in the field told him they would be leading the troops in, personally. "He has to be in the field," said Deputy Defense Minister MK Matan Vilnai (Labor-Meimad). "He is doing things we have forgotten must be done."

Leading by example

Ashkenazi's belief in leading by example is anything but hype: He spent every single day of the Gaza offensive wearing his field uniform, gun in holster, and sleeping in his office at the IDF Kirya Base in Tel Aviv. At night, when the roads are empty, he can make it back home to Kfar Saba in about 15 minutes; but then again, as he said, the commander of the Golani Brigade has not been sleeping in his own bed lately, either.

"Ashkenazi fits Israeli society like a glove," a senior officer deployed to Gaza said. "That might not have been the case in the past, but now, after the Second Lebanon War, after a chief of staff who was all about hubris and technology, we have a guy that says 'listen up – this is war and we have to be brave, we have to charge forward, we have to lead.' This is the kind of thing they teach you about."

The Gaza offensive has Ashkenazi living by "warfare time": He starts his day with a security briefing held in the Kirya bunker, goes on to a strategy forum, where he authorizes targets and give his top officers their daily orders; and then has two separate situation briefings. He goes out to the filed as often as he can and makes sure to speak with the hospital administrators treating the wounded soldiers, daily .

He kept his cool, we were told, upon hearing of the deadly friendly fire incident, which took place in the northern Gaza neighborhood of Jabalya and claimed the lives of three soldiers, leaving 24 wounded. The message was clear: You do not let success go to you head any more than you let failure stop you in your tracks.

The soldiers love him. "When he's with the troops, you see a guy that is all about the field; not someone that just drops in, says 'Hi, how are you' and give a lecture about his latest conversation with the prime minister," said a senior officer. "He talks about what needs to be done and people admire him for that, for speaking to them at eye-level.

"Personally, I think that what changed the most is the fighting spirit. It's exactly what the military needed and you can see it run through the entire chain of command."

The difference between the IDF of 2006 and that of today is noted in more than just the newfound spirit: "The military readiness is exceptional," said Major-General (Res.) Danny Rothschild. "The home front, equipment wise, warfare tactics – you see it in almost every aspect."

Learning from the best

The most noted change has to do with the so-called "LCD culture": "We all remember the brigade commanders in the Second Lebanon War, sitting at their computers while their men were in the field," said Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee member and Minister of Pensioner Affairs Rafi Eitan. "Now they are the first in the field. Ashkenazi understands modern warfare, but he has re-infused the military with indispensable spirit. "

Ashkenazi, despite the responsibility he now shoulders, has stayed in the field: "He took an active part in some of the pre-war operations," said Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee member MK Isaac Ben-Israel (Kadima). "The primary quality a chief of staff must have, is the ability to focus on what's really important, to understand the gist of things, often in the midst of a lot of hustle and confusion. That's a quality Ashkenazi has in abundance."

Ahead of the military campaign, Ashkenazi "enlisted" the help of Uri Sagi, Eyal Ben-Reuven, Yom-Tov Samia, Yoram Yair and several others – all retired IDF generals with dozens of years of filed experience between them. "He is willing to listen, learn and take advice, and he lends that tone to his officers," said Yair. "The experience men who have seen past wars have is priceless, and being open to it is very important."

He also spends time – too much time if you ask him –meeting with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and other members of the National Security Cabinet.

Those close to Ashkenazi say he sits in the cabinet meetings with obvious reluctance, estranged to the political territory. Nevertheless, prior to launching the Gaza offensive, he spent hours in the cabinet, ensuring the ministers understood every last detail; so that he would not be held solely responsible if the campaign failed, some said.

The chief of staff is not a favorite among politicians and scarcely appears before the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. "There is a feeling he looks down on the committee," said one of its members. "He's this great commander who doesn’t really answer to anyone, and he tends to be blunt... Maybe the situation makes him nervous."

Ode to ambiguity

The past several months have seen Ashkenazi reluctant to take Gaza's Palestine Square. "He's very cautious. Loosing soldiers is a very sensitive matter as far as he's concerned," said a fellow General Staff officer. "He lost men before, his son is with the Egoz Brigade and ordering a ground incursion was not easy for him, although he ended up supporting the move."

Once the operational strategies of a surprise air raid on Gaza were decided on, the details made their way out of the cabinet meeting, prompting Hamas heads to go underground. Ashkenazi lobbied to postpone the offensive, saying he "will not strike at real estate." Along with the political echelon, he then devised a series of decoy maneuvers meant to lead Hamas into a false sense of security: IDF forces went on leave and Barak suggested Israel will reopen the crossings. The move, however, proved only partially successful as only some of Hamas' officials took the bait.

The more complex the Gaza situation became, the more ambiguous Ashkenazi's opinions seem to get. When Barak advocated holding fire, when Livni said it was time for a unilateral ceasefire and when Olmert was adamant to forge on, Ashkenazi kept silent. He said the military should be kept out of the political discourse and presented the government with data, contingencies and operational options; but ultimately, he left the final decisions up to them.

Some say it is a case of him internalizing the lessons of the Winograd Commission, others say he operates with the next commission of inquiry in mind: "It's like he's saying 'I will not be the one making decisions for you. I work for you – tell me what to do and I'll do it'," said a source close to Olmert. "His message in very clear and very different from Halutz', who always had an opinion about everything."

Some, however, see Ashkenazi's constant evading as being overly cautious: "No one expect Ashkenazi to pull chestnuts out of the fire for anyone, but when the chief of staff has a clear point of view it has a different impact than a minister's one, because a minister will always be seen as someone who has a political agenda, something the chief of staff is free of," said a source in the Defense Ministry. "Maybe it’s the trauma caused by the outcome of previous wars, where the chief of staff was always made to be the scapegoat, that's making him be so guarded."

Politics of war

Waging war with an election looming is not as easy task. Ashkenazi himself has been heard saying, jokingly, that he would not recommend to any of his peers – chiefs of staff around the world – to begin a military campaign during election time.

Shortly before the Gaza offensive began, Barak forbade him from meeting Olmert. Olmert "retaliated" by not sending Mossad Chief Meir Dagan to Defense Ministry meetings. Ashkenazi said nothing. His private meeting with Olmert resumed a month ago.

Unlike the relationship Olmert and Halutz had in 2006, the one the prime minister has with Ashkenazi is far more formal; but Olmert still holds Ashkenazi in high regard and appreciates the chemistry he has with Shin Bet Chief Yuval Diskin.

Ashkenazi's relationship with Barak is far more intense. Cabinet and Defense Ministry meetings aside, they meet once or twice a day, privately, atop several phone conversations, all in an effort to present a united front. This harmonious relationship, said people familiar with the inner workings of the defense establishment, is a rarity: "There is absolutely no tension between them, they pose no threat to one another and they see eye to eye on things," said a security source.

Mr. discipline

Some, however, say there is more to the situation than meets the eye: "Ashkenazi is completely dismissive of Barak," said an aide to Opposition Leader Benjamin Netanyahu. "He doesn’t let him have a say in nominations and promotions within the military, even though it is up to the defense minister to shape the military's top echelon. Ashkenazi manages somehow to keep Barak away from such things… On top of that, his generals are afraid to speak directly with the defense minister, because they would seemingly be going over his head if they did that. It can't be good if the senior officers are afraid to speak their mind."

Ashkenazi is indeed considered a strict disciplinarian. "The subject of discipline is very important to Gabi," said Brigadier General (Res.) Giora Inbar. "Even his deputy,

Major-General Dan Harel salutes him when he enters his office. Some would say that that's the way things should work in the military, but other think that at that level things would be a little friendlier."

Sources in the General Staff admitted that all the senior officers, Harel included, do salute Ashkenazi, "but only in the presence of strangers," never when they are alone. It is sign of respect, not fear, they said.

A senior officer, recently discharged, offers a different perspective: "He's brutal, he's impatient and he shuts you up. He's also unpredictable and he holds a grudge, that's why everyone is scared."

Battle scars

Normally, he reserved the weekends for his family. The Ashkenazis lead a modest life, and own an apartment in Kfar Saba. When he was named chief of staff, Ashkenazi gathered all of his neighbors and apologized in advance for any inconvenience they might experience. He shies away from glitzy parties and fancy restaurants, and goes hiking as often as he can, usually in northern Israel - a terrain he is vastly familiar with form his days as GOC Northern Command.

Ashkenazi is one of the few senior officers in today's General Staff to have taken part in the Yom Kippur War, as well in operations Litani and Entebbe. He later became commander of the Golani Brigade and later still head of the IDF's Operations Branch under then Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak and in 1998 was named GOC Northern Command.

In 1999, then-Prime Minister Barak tasked him with pulling the Israeli troops out of southern Lebanon, and gave him 48 hours to complete the mission. Ashkenazi delivered in half the time. The withdrawal's afterglow came to an end 18 month later, with the October kidnapping of staff sergeants Adi Avitan, Omar Souad and Benny Avraham by Hizbullah at the Mount Dov sector; which took place after Hizbullah blew up one of the sector's gates and ambushed the three.

A subsequent inquiry report, complied by former Head of the Northern Command Yossi Peled, cleared Ashkenazi from any direct operational responsibility and noted that he was the one who warned his superiors that the gate might be compromised. The Report did, however, fault him for inaccurately marking the sector's boundaries, as far as Division 36 and Division 91 – the two manning it – were concerned. "Everyone is trying to play it down, but the truth is that three soldiers were abducted under his command," said a recently retired senior officer. "That was not a simple thing and it stayed with him."

The ambiguity seems to be working so far. With the exception of three Israeli reporters who were granted limited access to the battlefield, the only images emerging from Gaza are those taken by the IDF Spokesman's Unit. Operation Cast Lead has been represented in the media almost solely by IDF Spokesman Benayahu, and Ashkenazi's silence is perceived by the public as a wise move meant to serve the IDF's interests.

"He has a reason for not giving any interviews," said a senior member of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. "He doesn’t like the feeling of not having any control on his surrounding. Once you keep quiet, people see is as a sign of intelligence. The media doest say anything because anyone he criticizes him won't be given any information. The IDF has everyone by the balls."

"When he finally does give interview, everyone will see just how articulate he is," said Inbar. "It's just that right now, he knows the public doesn’t expect the chief of staff to babble. Everyone talked during the Second Lebanon War and most of it was utter nonsense, so now (the IDF) is going in the opposite direction."

Resistance is futile

But not everyone is a member of the Ashkenazi fan club. The Left claims that he has crossed every red line conceivable in his shelling of Gaza.

"This has been the most inhumane fight in the history of the IDF," said prominent leftist persona Uri Avnery. "Ashkenazi strikes me as the kind of man who only looks at the technical aspects of things and allows for no human consideration. I see him as war machine… It wouldn’t surprise me if when all this is done, the world will demand he be tried at The Hague."

The word in Gaza, said a Palestinian reporter, "is that he is incapable of making his own decisions; that he is Olmert and Barak's lackey and that he is only following orders. They say he is a quiet man, but I think he just hates Arabs."

Ashkenazi was considered as a possible chief of staff back in 2005, after then-Chief Moshe Yaalon was dismissed, but then-Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz ended up choosing IAF Chief Dan Halutz.

Shortly after Amir Peretz took over the Defense Ministry he decided to name Ashkenazi director-general of the ministry. The two formed a solid working relationship, which prevailed over their disagreements – the most notable of all involving the Iron Dome project: Peretz pressed for the anti-missile system project, meant to protect Israel against short-to-mid range rockets; but Ashkenazi thought that at $50,000 per-interception, it was a colossal waste of money, but nevertheless tackled the mission, full steam ahead.

"That's one of his better qualities, maintaining professional integrity. He'll fight for his point of view, but once a decision is made, he will give it his all," said a security source.

In the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War and once Halutz tendered his resignation, Peretz named Ashkenazi IDF chief of staff. "Working with him only increased my admiration for him," said Peretz. "You can see his motivation stems from a sense of responsibility for the State. In knew he was the right man for the job."

When the going gets tough

Ashkenazi set out to revolutionize the IDF. As soon as he took office he began overturning his predecessor's decision, forming new division and reinstating the Logistics Directorate.

He came up with a five-year plan meant to restore the IDF's might. When he brought it before the cabinet, it was so important to him that the ministers become verse in its details that the meeting took 12 hours.

Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee member MK Yuval Steinitz (Likud), however, tried to temper the enthusiasm: "We cannot allow for euphoria over the success in Gaza," he said. "We have to give the IDF credit for being able to beat Hamas with a relatively small number of casualties, but it says nothing about our ability to deal with Hizbullah or Syria."

"None of the brigade, division or company commanders is euphoric, I can promise you that," said a source close to the chief of staff. "No one will try to portray Gaza like another Six Day War. Gabi is the last one to rest on any laurels and the last one to cut anyone any slack.

"The military, this operation will undergo the same scrutiny and inquires as the failed excursion in Lebanon."


Senator Sam Brownback: After Oslo, A Way Forward





When it comes to America's foreign policy and diplomacy, the significance of the Gaza conflict is clear. The disintegration of Hamas-run Gaza represents the final step in the demise of the Oslo two-state paradigm. On the question of what role the United States should play moving forward, the path is also clear, but it will require the new administration, and the foreign policy establishment, to shed its fixation with the stagnant two-state model and work toward a regional solution that would lead to a more promising and secure future for Palestinians and Israelis.

The background to the current fighting illustrates the failure of the Oslo paradigm. Founded to destroy the entire State of Israel through "a great and serious struggle against the Jews," Hamas has implemented its goals through a policy of wholesale slaughter of innocent Israeli civilians. In 2001, Hamas began launching rockets into southern Israel, only seven months after former prime minister Ehud Barak offered Yasser Arafat a state on 98 percent of the land sought by Palestinians for that purpose. Rather than pacifying the Palestinians, Israel's territorial overtures sparked a second intifada led by the Palestinian Authority itself, killing and wounding thousands of innocent people.

NONETHELESS, ISRAEL pushed ahead with the two-state formula, seeking to alleviate conditions that Palestinians were using to justify their violence. In 2005, Israel fully evacuated its military presence in Gaza, and forcibly removed all Jewish presence from there as well. But the gesture backfired again, driving more Palestinians into the ranks of radical groups like Hamas, culminating with Hamas's takeover of Gaza in 2006, after it easily brushed aside the feckless Fatah forces under Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. With territory of its own, and no credible Palestinian opposition, Hamas ramped up its rocket and mortar attacks against Israeli towns and villages. All of southern Israel's citizens - Jewish and Arab - lived in constant state of terror, with many killed and wounded. An Egyptian brokered cease-fire this year only led to Israel watching as Hamas armed itself with longer-range and more deadly projectile weapons, while the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority remained holed up in Ramallah, unable or unwilling to do anything about it all.

No doubt, President-elect Barack Obama's foreign policy advisers are in the midst of evaluating US Middle East policy and planning for the new administration. The key question for the president will be whether to resuscitate the two-state proposal and ask Israel to entrust more land in the hands of the PA. His conclusion should be the same as that of a trauma doctor facing a painful reality: that after administering many defibrillations - Wye River, Camp David II, the road map and Annapolis - the two-state plan, based on land for peace, has flat-lined. Territorial concessions made directly to the Palestinians augment, rather than diminish, the zeal for violence against Israel. Were Israel to apply this concept to the West Bank, few doubt that the area would swiftly transform into an armed and radicalized entity identical to Gaza. Such an outcome would greatly undermine not only the security of Israel and Jordan, but also of the United States.

HOWEVER, THE failure of the two-state plan does not leave the new president without options. Doing away with a plan that has crumbled away over 15 years opens a rare opportunity for Middle East experts and diplomats to get back to the fundamental question of how best to fulfill Palestinians' political and economic aspirations while improving security for Israel. At a moment of uncertainty in the Middle East, as well as one of transition in American politics, we should be encouraging creative thinking in foreign policy rather than continuing to resurrect a stagnant proposal.

One important idea that merits attention is to shift our policy to one that expects, perhaps even requires, both Jordanian and Egyptian participation in shaping the future of the territories they border. Doing so would inject a new sense of trust and responsibility among all the stakeholders of this conflict. It would also stimulate discussion of more viable political arrangements, such as Palestinian federation or confederation. These proposals - not entirely new, but also not vigorously debated by our foreign policy establishment - could yield far greater political and economic returns for Palestinians than the two-state proposal has achieved after 15 years and billions of dollars spent.

WHY WOULD Jordan and Egypt get involved? First, both countries have grave interests at stake in the future of the West Bank and Gaza, most significantly to halt the spread of Iranian-backed extremism in their backyards. On this issue, the question has never been if Egypt and Jordan were going to insert themselves, only when. Second, to the extent that Egypt and Jordan can provide security guarantees where the Palestinians cannot, the process would provide reassurance to otherwise skeptical Israeli security officials. As such, increased Jordanian and Egyptian roles and responsibilities in the territories should be made a key component of our Middle East policy.

Opponents of this idea argue that the regional approach denies Palestinians the right to self-determination. Not so. Polling indicates that a growing number of Palestinians - including several high-ranking PA officials - support the idea of confederation over independence. This makes sense if one considers that the only accomplishment of the PA has been an increase in poverty, violence, corruption and despair. On top of that, the yawning political gap between Gaza and the West Bank has stimulated a cultural schism that undermines the viability of united statehood. Simply put, Palestinians in search of a better life view the idea of an independent Palestine as increasingly less appealing and less viable.

In truth, the obstacle to pursuing such a plan comes not from the Palestinians, the Egyptians or the Jordanians, but from our own foreign policy establishment, which has sunk enormous resources into the two-state plan and hesitates to walk away. But the cause of peace requires an honest assessment of what has worked and what has not. The time has come to cut our losses on a failed experiment and pursue regional solutions that will lead to peace and prosperity in a troubled region.

The writer is a Republican US senator from Kansas.


Caroline Glick: History's tragic farce



It is a fundamental truth that while history always repeats itself, it almost never repeats itself precisely. There is always a measure of newness to events that allows otherwise intelligent people to repeat the mistakes of their forebears without looking completely ridiculous.

Given this, it is hard to believe that with the advent of the Obama administration, we are seeing history repeat itself with nearly unheard of exactness. US President Barack Obama's appointment of former Sen. George Mitchell as his envoy for the so-called Palestinian-Israeli "peace process" will provide us with a spectacle of an unvarnished repeat of history.

In December 2000, outgoing president Bill Clinton appointed Mitchell to advise him on how to reignite the "peace process" after the Palestinians rejected statehood and launched their terror war against Israel in September 2000. Mitchell presented his findings to Clinton's successor, George W. Bush, in April 2001.

Mitchell asserted that Israel and the Palestinians were equally to blame for the Palestinian terror war against Israelis. He recommended that Israel end all Jewish construction outside the 1949 armistice lines, and stop fighting Palestinian terrorists.

As for the Palestinians, Mitchell said they had to make a "100 percent effort" to prevent the terror that they themselves were carrying out. This basic demand was nothing new. It formed the basis of the Clinton administration's nod-nod-wink-wink treatment of Palestinian terrorism since the Palestinian Authority was established in 1994.

By insisting that the PLO make a "100 percent effort," to quell the terror it was enabling, the Clinton administration gave the Palestinians built-in immunity from responsibility. Every time that his terrorists struck, Yasser Arafat claimed that their attacks had nothing to do with him. He was making a "100 percent effort" to stop the attacks, after all.

After getting Arafat off the hook, the Clinton administration proceeded to blame Israel. If Israel had just given up more land, or forced Jews from their homes, or given the PLO more money, Arafat could have saved the lives of his victims.

Mitchell's plan, although supported by then-secretary of state Colin Powell, was never adopted by Bush because at the time, terrorists were massacring Israelis every day. It would have been politically unwise for Bush to accept a plan that asserted moral equivalence between Israel and the PLO when rescue workers were scraping the body parts of Israeli children off the walls of bombed out pizzerias and bar mitzva parties.

But while his eponymous plan was rejected, its substance, which was based on the Clinton Plan, formed the basis of the Tenet Plan, the road map plan and the Annapolis Plan. And now, Mitchell is about to return to Israel, at the start of yet another presidential administration to offer us his plan again.

MITCHELL, OF COURSE, is not the only one repeating the past. His boss, Barack Obama, is about to repeat the failures his immediate predecessors. Like Clinton and Bush, Obama is making the establishment of a Palestinian state the centerpiece of his foreign policy agenda.

Obama made this clear his first hour on the job. On Wednesday at 8 a.m., Obama made his first phone call to a foreign leader. He called PLO chief Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah. During their conversation, Obama pledged his commitment to Palestinian statehood.

Fatah wasted no time responding to Obama's extraordinary gesture. On Wednesday afternoon Abbas convened the PLO's Executive Committee in Ramallah and the body announced that future negotiations with Israel will have to be based on new preconditions. As far as the PLO is concerned, with Obama firmly in its corner, it can force Israel to its knees.

And so, the PLO is now uninterested in the agreements it reached with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. For Israel to enjoy the privilege of negotiating with the PLO, it must first announce its willingness to expel all the 500,000 or so Israeli Jews who live in Judea, Samaria and the neighborhoods in east, south and north Jerusalem built since 1967, as well as in the Old City, and then hand the areas over, lock, stock and barrel, to the PLO.

This new PLO "plan" itself is nothing new. It is simply a restatement of the Arab "peace plan," which is just a renamed Saudi "peace plan," which was just a renamed Tom Friedman column in The New York Times. And the Friedman plan is one that no Israeli leader in his right mind can accept. So by making this their precondition for negotiations, the PLO is doing what it did in 2000. It is rejecting statehood in favor of continued war with Israel.

What is most remarkable about the new administration's embrace of its predecessors' failed policy is how uncontroversial this policy is in Washington. It is hard to come up with another example of a policy that has failed so often and so violently that has enjoyed the support of both American political parties. Indeed, it is hard to think of a successful policy that ever enjoyed such broad support.

Apparently, no one in positions of power in Washington has stopped to consider why it is that in spite of the fervent backing of presidents Clinton and Bush, there is still no Palestinian state.

SINCE ISRAEL recognized the PLO as the "sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" in 1993, the US and Israel have based their plans for peace on their assumption that the PLO is interested in making peace. And they have based their plans for making peace by establishing a Palestinian state on the assumption that the Palestinians are interested in statehood. Yet over the past 15 years it has become abundantly clear that neither of these assumptions is correct.

In spite of massive political, economic and military support by the US, Israel and Europe, the PLO has never made any significant moves to foster peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinians. Not only did the PLO-led PA spend the six years between 1994 and 2000, in which it was supposedly making peace with Israel, indoctrinating Palestinian society to hate Jews and seek their destruction through jihadist-inspired terrorism. It also cultivated close relations with Iran and other rogue regimes and terror groups.

Many are quick to claim that these misbehaviors were simply a consequence of Arafat's personal radicalism. Under Abbas, it is argued, the PLO is much more moderate. But this assertion strains credulity. As The Jerusalem Post's Khaled Abu Toameh reported on Monday, Fatah forces today boast that their terror cells in Gaza took active part in Hamas's missile offensive against Israel. Fatah's Aksa Martyrs terror cells claim that during Operation Cast Lead, its terrorists shot 137 rockets and mortar shells at Israel.

Abbas's supporters in the US and Israel claim that these Fatah members acted as they did because they are living under Hamas rule. They would be far more moderate if they were under Fatah rule. But this, too, doesn't ring true.

From 2000 through June 2007, when Hamas ousted Fatah forces from Gaza, most of the weapons smuggling operations in Gaza were carried out by Fatah. Then, too, most of the rockets and mortar shells fired at Israel were fired by Fatah forces. Likewise, most of the suicide bombers deployed from Judea and Samaria were members of Fatah.

The likes of Madeleine Albright, Powell and Condoleezza Rice claimed that Fatah's collusion with Hamas and Islamic Jihad and its leading role in terror was a consequence of insufficient Israeli support for Arafat and later for Abbas. If Israel had kicked out the Jews of Gaza earlier, or if it had removed its roadblocks and expelled Jews from their homes in Judea and Samaria, or if had prevented all Jewish construction beyond the 1949 armistice lines, then Arafat and later Abbas would have been more popular and able to rein in their own terror forces. (Incidentally, those same forces receive their salaries from the PA, which is funded by the US and Israel.)

THE PROBLEM with this line of thinking is that it ignores two essential facts. First, since 2000 Israel has curtailed Jewish building in Judea and Samaria. Second, Israel kicked every last Jew out of Gaza and handed the ruins of their villages and farms over to Fatah in September 2005.

It is worth noting that the conditions under which the PA received Gaza in 2005 were far better than the conditions under which Israel gained its sovereignty in 1948. The Palestinians were showered with billions of dollars in international aid. No one wanted to do anything but help them make a go of it.

In 1948-49, Israel had to secure its sovereignty by fending off five invading armies while under an international arms embargo. It then had to absorb a million refugees from Arab countries and Holocaust survivors from Europe, with no financial assistance from anyone other than US Jews. Israel developed into an open democracy. Gaza became one of the largest terror bases in the world.

Four months after Israel handed over Gaza - and northern Samaria - the Palestinians turned their backs on statehood altogether when they elected Hamas - an explicitly anti-nationalist, pan-Islamic movement that rejects Palestinians statehood - to lead them.

Hamas's electoral victory, its subsequent ouster of Fatah forces from Gaza and its recent war with Israel tells us another fundamental truth about the sources of the repeated failure of the US's bid for Palestinian statehood. Quite simply, there is no real Palestinian constituency for it.

Even if we were to ignore all of the PLO's involvement in terrorism and assume like Obama, Bush and Clinton that the PLO is willing to live at peace with Israel in exchange for Gaza, Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem, what Hamas's control of Gaza and its popularity throughout the Palestinian areas show is that there is no reason to expect that the PLO will remain in control of territory that Israel transfers to its control. So if Israel were to abide by the PLO's latest demand and accept the Friedman/Saudi/Arab/PLO "peace plan," there is no reason to believe that a Jew-free Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem wouldn't then be taken over by Hamas.

Given that there is no chance that Israeli territorial giveaways will lead to a peaceful Palestinian state, the question arises, is there any way to compel American politicians to give up their fantasies of fancy signing ceremonies in the White House Rose Garden that far from bringing peace, engender radicalism, instability and death?

As far as Mitchell is concerned the answer is no. In an address at Tel Aviv University last month, Mitchell said that the US and Israel must cling to the delusion that Palestinian statehood will bring about a new utopia, "for the alternative is unacceptable and should be unthinkable."

So much for "change" in US foreign policy.

Originally published in The Jerusalem Post.


Friday, January 23, 2009

Yoram Ettinger: The Palestinian Pandora's Box



The Palestinian Pandora's Box

Yoram Ettinger, Ynet, January 23, 2009

The mild reaction by Arab countries to the Hamas-driven Palestinian predicament in Gaza refutes the assumption that the Palestinian issue is a top Arab priority and that it constitutes the core cause of Arab hostility toward the West, USA and Israel. In fact, the Arab reaction has reflected overall Arab attitude toward the Palestinian issue since 1948, through the 1982 Israel-PLO war in Lebanon and the First and Second Intifadah, irrespective of the identity of the Palestinian leadership: Haj Amin al-Husseini, Shukeiri, Hammuda, Arafat, Abu Mazen or Haniyeh.

Arab countries have always showered Palestinians with rhetoric, but they have refrained from significant support. During the 2009 Gaza War, Arab countries rejected the call for an emergency session of Arab leaders on behalf of Gaza. They have limited their meek support to a gathering of Arab foreign ministers, calling for a UN emergency session. Saudi Arabia dismissed the suggestion to employ oil as a weapon. Riad prohibits pro-Palestinian rallies and its religious establishment issued a weak proclamation on behalf of the Palestinian struggle. The Gulf Cooperation Council focused on economic and monetary issues during its December 30, 2008 meeting, according lips service to Gaza.

A similar reaction occurred during the 1982 Israel-PLO war in Lebanon, which erupted on June 4. The Arab oil producing countries convened in August to discuss the price of oil, dismissing the proposal to use the oil weapon on behalf of the PLO. The summit of Arab leaders was deliberately delayed until September, following the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut.

Arab leaders have systematically demonstrated how secondary the Palestinian issue has been in their order of national priorities. For instance, Arab financial support of the PLO was less than 10% of Arab financial support to the anti-Soviet Muslims in Afghanistan. In 1988, the Arab League convened on behalf of the First Intifadah, committing itself to $128MN immediate support, followed by $43MN monthly assistance. Less than $100MN was actually transferred to the PLO, compared with over $1BN annual support to Afghanistan during 1978-1988. In 2002, Saudi Arabia pledged $600MN for the Second Intifadah, but only $100MN has been transferred so far. Other Arab countries made a $55MN monthly commitment, but – as expected – they have once again failed to deliver.

Recent precedents have led Arabs to consider the Palestinians a potential treacherous, subversive, explosive Pandora's box, which could undermine their survival. On the other hand, Palestinians blame Arab leaders for the "1948 Debacle."

In 1948/9, the Arab League made it clear that the war against the Jewish State was not launched because – or for – the Palestinians. It declared the provisional Palestinian government null and void, while Egypt and Jordan expelled the Palestinian leadership from Gaza, Judea and Samaria. During the late 1950s, and in 1966, Arafat, Abu Mazen and their Fatah colleagues were evicted from Egypt and Syria for subversion. In 1970, they were decimated in Jordan, following an attempt to topple the Hashemite regime ("Black September"). In 1975/76, they were clobbered by Syria (in Lebanon), as a result of their assault on the central government in Beirut ("Black June"). In 1983, they lost their base in Tripoli, Lebanon, after they failed to challenge the dominant local militia. In 1987, Egypt killed scores of Palestinians, who demonstrated on behalf of the First Intifadah in the Rafah refugee camp in Sinai/Gaza. In 1991, Kuwait expelled 300,000 Palestinians for collaboration with Saddam's plunder of the sheikhdom. Since 2003, thousands of Palestinians have fled Iraq, due to their identification with the Butcher of Baghdad. The Red Carpet, which welcomes Palestinian leaders at the UN and in Western capitals, is transformed into a shabby rug upon landing in Arab capitals.

What do Arab leaders know - about the Palestinians - which has escaped Western and Israeli policy-makers?

Arab leaders have not dedicated themselves to advance the Palestinian cause. They have not regarded the Palestinian issue as a premier link in the formulation of their policies. Domestic, regional and global factors have impacted inter-Arab, Arab-Western and Arab-Israel relations much more than the Palestinian issue. Palestinians do not possess veto power over Arab policy-making.

Since the 1993 Oslo Accord, Israel has subordinated its national security policy to the resolution of the Palestinian issue, switching its focus from the Israeli-Arab path to the Israeli-Palestinian path. Dozens of initiatives, conferences, summits, agreements and cease fires have yielded a series of short-lived illusions of peace and security, which were promptly crashed by an unprecedented Palestinian wave of hate-education, violation of commitments and terrorism. In fact, the roadmap toward the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict does not go through Ramallah or Gaza, but rather through Cairo, Amman and other Arab capitals, as evidenced by Israel's peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, which have withstood Palestinian opposition and an on-going Israeli war against Palestinian terrorism.

A policy which is based on an erroneous assumption – that the Palestinian issue is supposedly the crown jewel of Arab policy – constitutes an erroneous policy. It exacerbates regional instability, fuels terrorism, promotes war and diminishes the prospects for peace.

Israel should base its policy, toward the Palestinians, on the track record of the last 100 years, and especially the last 15 years, which have featured the failure of Land-for-Peace on the Palestinian track.

Lessons of recent history, Israel's minimal security requirements and the need to minimize motivation for Arab terrorism, highlight the necessity to solidify Israel's control of Judea and Samaria.


Armed men seize Jordanian relief cargo in Gaza



'Armed men seize Jordanian relief cargo in Gaza'
By Hani Hazaimeh Jordan Times 21 January 2009
http://www.jordantimes.com/?news=13669

AMMAN - Anonymous armed men captured a 13-truck convoy laden with foodstuff donated by Jordanians after entering the Gaza Strip, a Palestinian official told The Jordan Times Tuesday.

Neither the convoy's drivers nor the trucks, which entered Gaza at the Karm Abu Salem crossing, are Jordanian, said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The drivers were released; the hijackers drove the trucks.

The shipment was unloaded from a Jordanian convoy after it crossed into the Palestinian territories and then carried by non-Jordanian trucks rented by UNRWA into Gaza.

The Palestinian Authority official said: "This is not the first incident of this kind. We have learned that the food items, which were supposed to be given to Gazans for free, were being sold in the marketplace in Gaza City."

On Monday, an 11-truck convoy carrying food items from Kuwait was also seized at gunpoint, he added.

The Jordan Hashemite Charity Organisation spokesperson denied he was informed of any hijacked aid convoys.

Government officials in Amman did not know about the case or were not available for comment.

UNRWA spokesperson Sami Mshasha told The Jordan Times on the phone from Jerusalem that he was not aware of any hijacked aid convoy, being busy with arrangements for the visit of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to Gaza.

Mshasha said he would follow up on the report, but remained unavailable despite repeated attempts by The Jordan Times to contact him.



Thursday, January 22, 2009

Clifford D. May: The Battle of Gaza



The Battle of Gaza
Clifford D. May, Scripps Howard News Service,

Spanish translation here .

01/22/2009

Gaza: What took place in Gaza and Israel over the past three weeks was not a war - it was one battle in a war. Or, to be more precise, it was one battle in what the soldier/scholar John Nagl has described as a "global insurgency" aimed at overthrowing the existing order, what we used to call - in a more confident era - the Free World.

"Yes, Allah is greater than America." Hamas supreme leader Khaled Mashaal said on al-Jazeera television a few years ago. "Allah is greater than the superpowers. We say to this West: By Allah you will be defeated."

Too many people refuse to understand: Hamas is not fighting for a Palestinian state. Hamas is fighting for the annihilation of Israel which it would replace with an Islamic emirate. Not the same thing at all.

Hamas takes inspiration, funding and instructions from the ruling mullahs of Iran, heirs to the Iranian Revolution that erupted 30 years ago next month when the Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in France and established his theocratic regime. In the years since, Syria has become Iran's client; Hezbollah, based in Lebanon but with terrorist branches as far flung as South America, its proxy.

Israel's latest battle against Hamas began just after Christmas and ended just before the inauguration of Barack Obama. Israel's leaders apparently felt it prudent to announce a cease-fire before Obama sat down in the Oval Office and wrote "Stop the fighting!" at the top of his presidential to-do list.

In Arab and Muslim capitals, it did not go unnoticed that, as Hamas was being pounded by Israel, Iran did nothing to help. Nor was Hezbollah willing to open a second front on Israel's northern border. But as soon as a cease-fire was declared, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spun into action -- by spinning: According to official Iranian press reports, he called Mashaal -- who resides in Damascus rather than Gaza -- and told him: "Today is the beginning of victory!"

There are those who will believe him. But if Israel has succeeded in destroying most Hamas weapons caches and factories, as well as most of the tunnels through which Hamas imported thousands of missiles - even as it claimed Israel was blocking supplies of food, fuel and medicines through its "siege" - Israel achieved important, if short-term military goals.

Hamas spokesmen are saying they lost fewer soldiers than did the Israelis, and that they destroyed 47 Israeli tanks and armored vehicles. The carcasses of those machines have yet to be displayed for the cameras. And, by most accounts, Hamas fighters were short on both skills and fervor, despite Iranian and Hezbollah training. Many Hamas military commanders removed their uniforms and hid among women and children. "They turned houses and mosques into battlegrounds so that the people would protect them and those who trusted them now regret it," wrote Abd al-Fattah Shehadeh in the on-line Arabic newspaper ELAPH.

The European Union has warned that while humanitarian aid will be forthcoming, Gazans should not expect reconstruction assistance if Hamas continues to provoke new battles. "We don't want to go on to reconstruct Gaza every I-don't-know-how-many-years," said EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner. "We have been at the side of the Palestinian population always and we will be at their side, but at the same time it's also for the Palestinian population on both sides to say, ‘We want this peace.'"

That's a taller order than she probably understands. Prior to this battle it was not clear that most Palestinians wanted peace more than they wanted Israel's extinction. It's too soon to say whether their minds have been changed by the suffering they have endured. Even if that is the case, it would be unsafe for Gazans to say out loud that they'd prefer compromise in pursuit of coexistence to martyrdom in pursuit of victory.

There are those who will argue that Hamas wins merely by having survived. But Israel would have lost had it not fought -- had it continued to passively accept an endless rain of Hamas missiles on its citizens. Israelis knew that President Bush, during his final weeks in office, would not object if they tried to stop that rain. They don't yet know what President Obama will do in a similar circumstance.

Over the days ahead, Hamas may resume its attacks on Israel, or dig new tunnels to smuggle in new missiles to prepare for future attacks. If so, Israel may feel the need to respond strongly -- to re-establish deterrence and demonstrate that it can withstand pressure from those in the "international community" all too eager to try to appease radical Islam.

Iran will continue its drive to acquire nuclear weapons, a potential game-changer. But this is no game. It's a series of battles in a war that is likely to be as consequential as any in history.


Monday, January 19, 2009

Caroline Glick: Our World: 'Pictures of Victory'



On Sunday, Israelis were witness to a cavalcade of European leaders marching to Jerusalem to have their pictures taken with outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi came to Jerusalem from Sharm e-Sheikh, where they had their pictures taken with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. In both cities, they expressed their support for Israel's decision to stop fighting the Iranian-armed, financed and trained Hamas terror regime in Gaza.

Olmert greeted the Europeans leaders as great friends of Israel and claimed that their presence demonstrated that Israel's operation against Hamas enjoyed massive international support. Unfortunately, Olmert's statements were wrong on both counts. The leaders who came to Jerusalem are not friends of Israel and their presence in our capital did not demonstrate that Operation Cast Lead enjoyed international backing.

While sufficing with paying the most minimal lip service to Israel's inherent right to defend itself, the leaders who came to Jerusalem have been outspoken in their criticism of Israel's actual efforts to defend its citizens from Hamas aggression. None have publicly recognized that Israel has a duty to its citizens to defeat Hamas. To the contrary, all have claimed that there "is no military solution" to Israel's military conflict with Hamas.

And while these leaders have repeated vacuous bromides about the "tragedy of both sides," their voters have been much less circumspect in telling the Jews what think of us. Over the past three weeks, all of their countries, and indeed, all the countries in Western Europe have hosted large-scale, violent, anti-Semitic demonstrations and riots. And rather than condemn the anti-Jewish violence and incitement at these events, the Europeans leaders who came to Jerusalem have either sought to appease the anti-Semites or ignore them. German authorities for instance permitted Hamas supporters to wave Hamas flags at their hateful "peace demonstrations" while barring Israel supporters from holding Israeli flags or even displaying them in their windows.

In France, Sarkozy has equated his victimized Jewish community with the French Muslims who have been attacking them by claiming that his government "will not tolerate international tensions mutating into intercommunity violence." Given their refusal to support Israel in its fight against Hamas and their publics' growing hatred of Israel and the Jews, what made these Europeans leaders come to Jerusalem? As Gordon Brown and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner made clear in their remarks in Jerusalem, they came here to advance a hostile agenda. They want Israel to acquiesce to Hamas's demand to open its borders with Gaza and to support the opening of Egypt's border crossing with Gaza. They also intend to start giving Hamas hundreds of millions of dollars in "humanitarian aid" to rebuild Gaza.

If Europe gets its way, any gains that Israel made in Operation Cast Lead will quickly be erased. So the question then arises, why did Olmert, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Defense Minister Ehud Barak agree to have them come to Jerusalem? The short answer to this question is that Olmert, Livni and Barak view the European leaders as stage props. As they explained repeatedly since the outset of Operation Cast Lead, Israel's leaders sought to end the campaign with a "picture of victory." A group photo with Olmert, Sarkozy, Brown, Merkel, Zapatero and Berlusconi was the picture that they felt they needed. The fact that the picture came with demands that Israel cannot agree to without squandering its hard-earned gains in Gaza, is beside the point.

WHICH BRINGS us to the main point. What the parade of hostile foreigners in Jerusalem demonstrated clearly is that while the campaign in Gaza was touted by our leaders as a way to "change the security reality in the South," for our leaders, its most important goal was to change the electoral reality ahead of the February 10 general elections. Indeed, for them, the operation would have more appropriately been named "Operation Cast Ballots." Olmert, Livni and Barak claimed that by signing a memorandum of understanding with outgoing US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and due to Egyptian good will, Israel succeeded in building an international framework to prevent Hamas from rearming. But the MOU sets out no mechanism whatsoever for interdicting weapons shipments to Gaza on the high seas. And Egypt for its part has refused to agree to take any concerted action to prevent the weapons shipments from docking in its ports and transiting its territory en route to Gaza.

The other operational goal that Livni, Olmert and Barak set for the campaign was to restore Israel's deterrence and so convince Hamas to stop firing its missiles on southern Israel. But, as Hamas's continued firing of missiles at southern Israel after Olmert declared the cease-fire on Saturday night showed, Israel failed to deter Hamas.

But while they failed to accomplish either of Operation Cast Lead's operational goals, they did accomplish - at least for now - their main strategic goal. They succeeded in not losing.

By waging Operation Cast Lead, Olmert, Livni and Barak hoped to turn the absence of military defeat into the building blocks of political triumph. The operation was supposed to secure their political futures in three ways. First, it was supposed to change the subject of the electoral campaign.

As Olmert looks ahead to retirement, and as Livni and Barak vie with Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu to replace him, all three politicians wanted the elections to be about something other than their failures to defeat Hizbullah, their failure to defend the South from Hamas's growing arsenal, and their failure to contend with Iran's nuclear weapons program. This goal was accomplished by Operation Cast Lead, Their second goal - and perhaps Olmert's primary objective - was to erase the public's memory of Israel's strategic failure in the Second Lebanon War. This goal was partially achieved. The IDF performed with greater competence in Gaza than in Lebanon. And Israel achieved its aim of not being defeated in Gaza. As a result, the nation feels much more confident about the IDF's ability to defend the country.

THE MAIN difference between how Operation Cast Lead has ended and how the Second Lebanon War ended has little to do with how the IDF performed. The most important difference is Israel has not agreed to have an international force stationed in Gaza as it accepted (and in Livni's case, championed) the deployment of UNIFIL forced in South Lebanon. Since Hizbullah has used UNIFIL as a screen behind which it has rearmed and reasserted its military control over South Lebanon, the absence of such a force in Gaza is a net gain for Israel.

But again, if Israel permits Europe and the UN to flood Gaza with aid money - which will all go directly to Hamas - it will be enabling a new mechanism to be formed that will shield Hamas from the IDF and enable it to rebuild its arsenals and strengthen its control over Gaza.

This prospect is made all the more dangerous by the fact that Israel ended the campaign without taking control over the Gaza-Egypt border. By leaving the border zone under Hamas control, Israel left the path clear for Iran to resupply Hizbullah's armed forces with missiles and rockets. As Shin Bet Director Yuval Diskin explained on Sunday, under the present circumstances, Hamas can be expected to rebuild its arsenals in as little as three months.

THE THIRD political aim that Olmert, Livni and Barak sought to achieve in waging Operation Cast Lead was to convince the Israeli public that their worldview is correct. That worldview asserts that the world is divided between the extremist Islamic fundamentalists and the moderates. They claim that the latter group includes Arab dictatorships like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and democracies like Turkey, the EU, and Israel. The Kadima-Labor worldview also asserts that by surrendering territory to the Arabs, Israel will receive international legitimacy for any acts of self-defense it is forced to take in the event it is attacked from the territories it vacated.

Although the local media, with their sycophantic celebration of Mubarak and support for Israeli withdrawals have supported this view, it is far from clear that the public has been convinced of its wisdom. Between Turkey's open support for Hamas and vilification of Israel, Egypt's abject refusal to take any concrete action to end weapons smuggling to Gaza, and Fatah's fecklessness and hostility, Israelis have been given ample proof this month that the moderate camp is a fiction.

Moreover, the massive anti-Semitic riots in Europe and the US, and last week's anti-Israeli UN Security Council Resolution 1860 which the US refused to veto have made quite clear that Israel's withdrawals have brought it no sympathy whatsoever from the "moderate" camp.

Just as the goal of not losing did not bring Israel victory over Hamas, so too, Livni, Olmert and Barak's bid to use the operation to increase their political cache does not seem to have succeeded. Opinion polls taken in the aftermath of Olmert's announcement of the cease-fire on Saturday night showed that Likud has maintained, and even expanded, its lead against Kadima and Labor.

IN SPITE of its obvious limitations, Israelis can be pleased with the results of Operation Cast Lead on two counts. Although Hamas was not defeated, remains in full control of Gaza and has the ability to rebuild its forces, it was harmed. The IDF's operation did knock out its central installations, reduce its capacity to fight and killed some of its key leaders.

The second reason that Israelis can be pleased with the outcome is that it could have been much worse. The fact of the matter is that Operation Cast Lead was the most successful operation that Kadima and Labor are capable of leading.

With their capitulationist world view, they cannot bring Israel victory over our enemies. The most they can deliver is an absence of defeat. And so long as Israel doesn't allow Europe and the UN to begin transferring hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas, we will remain undefeated by Hamas.

Looking ahead to the challenges Israel's next government will face, Operation Cast Lead gave Israel between three to six months of security in the south before Hamas will be able to renew its missile offensive. It is during that time that the next government will need to contend with Israel's two greatest challenges - preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and preventing the new Obama administration from undermining Israel's strategic position by selling out Israel's security to buy "pictures of victory" of its own with Iran and Syria.

www.CarolineGlick.com

Sunday, January 18, 2009

the18's Michael Fenenbock Does Gaza





January 15, 2009
Jerusalem, Israel

Michael Fenenbock, veteran political consultant and founder of the18, made a lightning visit to the Gaza war zone yesterday to interact with IDF troops near the front.

Accompanied by senior security personnel, Fenenbock gained access to a zone where reporters are not permitted to enter. Fenenbock’s most striking impression was that morale is extremely high at all levels of command and that the professionalism and commitment of the IDF are impressive.

What follows is Michael’s first-hand report from the front lines.

Rafi, the head of security for 17 kibbutzim bordering the Gaza Strip is an extraordinary man. Of Iranian Jewish origin, he calmly conducts business with an Uzi in his lap, three cell phones, two radios and a walkie-talkie going at the same time; helicopters overhead, Israeli planes thundering in the distance; alarms announcing the firing of Kassam rockets at Ashkelon and the kibbutzim; Rafi calmly races between rocket attack locations.

Nearby, IDF soldiers covered in dust and grime, refit damaged tanks and send them spewing black diesel smoke back into the fray.

At the side of one of the massive IDF tanks I’m introduced to the young men of the tank crew who are taking a brief respite from the battle. “Hi, I’m Michael from New York.” “And I’m Sasha from Moscow,” one tall, fair-haired officer responds.

Another young soldier and I engage in a discussion about the New York Yankees and their prospects this year.

I talk to still more dust covered soldiers from the prestigious Golani Brigade. All express surprise, welcome, and appreciation for our visit and support.

“Are you getting everything you need?” I ask, remembering the dreadful reports from Israeli troops of shortages of supplies and food during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. This time, the answer always comes back the same. ‘Absolutely, we have everything.’

As we continue our tour of the staging area, we stand aside as an officer briefs a group of men while flipping the pages of aerial photographs. Three female soldiers in charge of piloting the intelligence drones drive by in an IDF jeep. They smile and wave.

In an open area next to a cultivated field is a sight not seen in other nations at war — hundreds of parked civilian cars. The cars belong to reservists who have reported for duty from all over the country. Much of the IDF is a civilian army.

Rafi calls a temporary halt to the briefing to take us into a kibbutz hothouse, where he hands us yellow bell peppers fresh off the vine. The kibbutz specializes in the production of bio-organic produce.

We munch away as reports come in that one of the kibbutz vehicles has taken a sniper bullet – Gaza is 200 yards away. Fortunately, the driver is unhurt.

From an observation post looking over Gaza that only a mountain goat could climb, we see smoke pouring from high-rise buildings in Gaza City. Rafi tells us that the city skyline has changed as of late. Many such buildings are used by Hamas as terrorist bases and rocket launchpads and so have been leveled by the IAF. It is a surgical operation.

Back at the kibbutz, Rafi stops to admonish four schoolboys who are outside kicking a soccer ball. “Shai, get back in the shelter and take your friends with you,” he yells.

The kids smile, wave, and continue kicking the soccer ball.

Rafi shares with us that when Israel removed all its citizens from Gaza three years ago he believed in the promise of peace. He had friends on the other side, men he negotiated with about building a maternity hospital that would serve mostly Palestinian women and about how the Karni crossing would become a mecca for trade.

But, Rafi explains, rolling his eyes and sadly shaking his head, it was all a ruse by the Gazans, an attempt to lull Jews into a false sense of security that would make them vulnerable to attack. “So that they could slaughter us,” Rafi says.

To underscore his point, Rafi shows us the last several days’ collection of jagged shrapnel – razor sharp pieces and mean-looking parts of the rockets fired on Israel’s southern residents. As we examine a piece of shrapnel we’re told the rocket it comes from was manufactured in China. Other rocket parts, Rafi tells us, come from Iran.

On the border, we pick up one of the flyers in Arabic that Israel distributed by the thousands to the citizens of Gaza, warning civilians of the impending military campaign.

As we drive out of the war zone and head north back to Jerusalem, we pass a soldier hitching a ride in the other direction, toward the battle. When I glance back, I see a car stop and pick him up.

A little further north we come upon the line up of news crews, trucks, cameras, and satellite dishes. They are only allowed to go as far as this point.

Michael Fenenbock is a long-time American political consultant. He and his wife Daphne are the founders of the18 and the No on Two-State campaign. They live in New York, but spend a great deal of time in Jerusalem.


Wednesday, January 14, 2009

Natan Sharansky: Save Gaza by Destroying Terror




Save Gaza by Destroying the Heart of Terror

Commentary by Natan Sharansky

Jan. 15 (Bloomberg) -- Israel’s war in Gaza has been met with cries of protest around the world. They come from two sources.

First, there are those who oppose any Israeli effort to defend itself, mainly because they don’t believe a Jewish state should exist at all. This is a form of anti-Semitism, and such a view should be rejected outright rather than argued with.

Second, there are those who support Israel’s existence, but believe it is wrong to wage so harsh an assault on the Gaza Strip. This argument also takes two forms: First, that Israel’s response is disproportionate and therefore wrong; and second, that there are less violent ways to handle Hamas -- through international pressure, sanctions or negotiations.

Both of these claims, as logical as they may sound, ignore the lessons of history, including Israel’s recent history in fighting terror. In the 10 years I served as a minister in Israel’s security cabinet, I learned just how mistaken such arguments can be.

On June 1, 2001, a suicide bomber attacked the entrance to the Dolphinarium discotheque in Tel Aviv. Twenty-one Israelis, mostly young people, were killed, and more than 130 injured. This was the latest in a long string of suicide bombings that had been launched since the start of the Second Intifada in September 2000.

Practicing Restraint

The next day, I took part in a dramatic cabinet meeting to discuss our options -- a Sabbath-day meeting, which only a true emergency could justify. Most of the ministers felt decisive action had to be taken. Military officials presented a plan for uprooting the terror infrastructure, through a complex campaign in the heart of Palestinian cities and refugee camps. Though the attack had been carried out by Hamas, it was clear that Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat had given them a green light. We had both the right and the ability to strike back.

Throughout the meeting, though, our foreign minister kept going in and out of the room, talking to world leaders and reporting back. His message was clear: Right now Israel enjoys the sympathy of the international community. As long as we keep our military response to a minimum, the world will continue to be on our side, and increased diplomatic pressure will rein in the terror. But if we launch a full-scale attack on the terrorists, we risk losing the world’s support and turning Arafat from an aggressor into a victim.

Proportionate Response

Eventually the prime minister was convinced of this approach, and the decision was made to stick to a proportionate response -- pinpoint attacks on terror cells, special operations, arrests -- and to allow diplomacy to work its magic.

Over the next nine months, Israel held its fire, and the world indeed condemned terrorism. But the attacks only increased. In the heart of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, suicide bombers blew up coffee shops, buses and hotels. Nightlife ground to a halt, tourism was decimated and hotels had to release most of their workers. One of my colleagues in the government, Rehavam Zeevi, was gunned down by terrorists. In the meantime, the U.S. suffered its own terror attacks on Sept. 11 and put intense pressure on us not to retaliate against the Palestinians, for fear of complicating its own war on al-Qaeda.

The situation came to a head in March 2002, when more than 130 Israelis were killed in a single month alone -- most infamously on March 27, Passover Eve, at the Park Hotel in Netanya. The next day, the cabinet convened -- again, in an extraordinary meeting during a religious holiday. The meeting started at 6 p.m. and lasted the night. This time, however, the government decided to launch Operation Defensive Shield -- the same plan the Israel Defense Forces had offered the previous year.

Worst Fears

In the international arena, our worst fears were realized. The United Nations condemned us, and the U.S. dispatched Secretary of State Colin Powell to tell us to stop the assault immediately. The global media mounted a brutal campaign depicting us as war criminals, spreading false rumors of the wholesale butchering of Palestinian civilians, describing the operation as the worst atrocity of modern history.

The most outrageous of these rumors was the Jenin libel, which was portrayed in a film produced largely from the fertile imagination of its director, and then shown around the world. It didn’t matter that, in fact, Israel had taken unprecedented measures to minimize civilian casualties, including refraining from using either aerial or artillery bombardment, putting its own soldiers at unprecedented risk; or that the UN commission that was created to investigate Jenin was soon disbanded for lack of evidence; or that the director of the film admitted that he had misled his audience.

Reputation Destroyed

For years to come, the “Jenin massacre” was the centerpiece of the anti-Israel propaganda machine, reverberating across Europe and on U.S. campuses as the symbol of Israeli iniquity. Our reputation was in tatters.

Yet all this was a small price to pay for what Israel gained. Within a few weeks, Palestinian terror was rendered ineffective, with the number of Israelis killed falling from hundreds per month to fewer than a dozen over the next year. Life returned to Israeli streets. Tourists returned by the hundreds of thousands. The economy started moving again.

No less important, though, was the effect Defensive Shield had on the Palestinians themselves. With the terror infrastructure removed, Palestinians could begin rebuilding their civic institutions and changing their attitude toward violence. Over time, Arafat’s policy of promoting terror was replaced by the far more cautious approach of his successor, Mahmoud Abbas.

West Bank Rebirth

In more than six years since the operation, the West Bank’s economy has boomed. If there is hope in the West Bank today, it is because Israel abandoned the ideas of proportionality and diplomacy in handling terror. The West Bank Palestinians know this; for this reason, they have not joined in the world’s rampant condemnation of Israel in the current war. While tens of thousands protest in Europe, West Bankers are mostly silent.

Understanding the war in Gaza means recognizing the lessons of 2002. During the three years that passed after pulling out all troops and settlements from the Gaza Strip in 2005, Israel chose to respond to Hamas’s deadly, daily rocket attacks with proportionality and diplomacy. The result? More rockets, more missiles, more misery for Palestinians -- and enough breathing space for Hamas to take over the Gaza Strip, devastate its society, build a much more powerful arsenal than it had in 2005 and become the vanguard of Iranian expansionism in the region.

Cancer Treatment

Terrorism is a cancer that can’t be cured through “proportional” treatments. It requires invasive surgery. It threatens not only democratic states that are its target, but also -- foremost -- the local civilians who are forced into its fanatical ranks, deployed as human shields, and devastated by its tyranny.

The longer one waits to treat it, the worse it gets, and the harsher the treatment required to defeat it. In southern Lebanon, where Israel failed to defeat the terrorists in 2006, the disease has only spread: Hezbollah now has three times the missiles it had before, and the terrorists have gained a stranglehold on the Lebanese government. Israel is determined not to repeat this mistake in Gaza.

Just as in 2002, Israel has chosen to fight the heart of terror, in the face of worldwide denunciation, mass demonstrations, UN resolutions, and talk of crimes against humanity. Now, as then, it is the right decision.

The operation is painful: The number of civilians hurt and killed, while far fewer than in comparable operations around the world, is still intolerably high -- a reflection of the size and depth of the terror infrastructure that has grown there over the last three years.

As in 2002, the real beneficiaries of a successful Israeli campaign will be the Palestinians themselves. Peace can be found only when Palestinians are given the freedom to build real civic institutions, and a leadership can emerge unafraid of telling its own citizens that violence, fanaticism and martyrdom aren’t the Palestinian way. But this can happen only once the malignancy of terror is removed from their midst. As ugly as it sounds, it is the only source of hope for Gaza.

(Natan Sharansky is chairman of the Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies in Shalem Center, a former deputy prime minister and the author of the recently published “Defending Identity: Its Indispensable Role in Protecting Democracy.” The opinions expressed are his own.)

To contact the author of this column: Natan Sharansky at natans@shalem.org.il
Last Updated: January 14, 2009 18:01 EST


Monday, January 12, 2009

Fred S. Teng: Enough is Enough




Fred S. Teng, President, Chinese Community Relations Council

Israel Solidarity Rally
, Sunday January 11, 2009, 11:00 am

Enough is enough.

I am here today not merely as a Chinese American feeling sympathy for the Jewish community. I am here today, because I was there. Yes, while the whole world was in Beijing watching the Olympics, I was in Israel. I was there in Sderot only a few months ago. I was minding my own business, visiting a university with JCRC. As we were walking into the parking lot, sirens went off. We were rushed back inside to a safe room. Later I found out it was a Qassam Rocket. That Qassam Rocket landed near a kindergarten and about half a mile away from where I was. Half a mile is like from here to the entrance of the Midtown Tunnel. 10 blocks down. I was furious of this reckless cruel terrorism, thinking how those children from this kindergarten might get hurt. I was furious because I have my daughter right next to me. The thought of my daughter might be injured, make me feel for all of the parents in Israel what they have to deal with every day.

Enough is enough.

I usually like to dress in black, and I like to think that I am standing up to all of the injustice in this world. But today I wear ORANGE. This orange is my solidarity with Gush Katif, 17 settlements, 8000 people, leaving behind $23 billion in assets, and with a production capacity that can earn $200 million a year. And what is the gratitude in return? Qassam Rockets? We cannot let Gush Katif and other settlements from West Bank and Gaza sacrificed in vain

Enough is enough

I was talking with a friend last week. If in New York, there are two buildings across from each other, and there are people in one building shooting bullets at the other building every day. Maybe one bullet a day, sometimes it is a nuisance, sometimes it scrape on someone's arms, and a few times the bullets kills a few people. Then one day, 80 bullets were shooting from this building every day. Do you shoot back 80 times, NO, you send in 500 to 1,000 people to the other building and kick down every door and find every shooter to put a stop to it.

Proportional Response is NOT an acceptable solution.

Enough is enough

These Qassam Rockets and the people behind them are like Drive-by Shootings. We have to put every gang member away for good, not just the ones that did the shooting.

These Qassam Rockets and the people behind them are like a Fire in the Forest,

You can't STOP only half of the fire in the forest, and thinking you will be safe.

If your house is next to the fire, you won't think so.

These Qassam Rockets and the people behind them are a Deadly Virus,

It is not the size; sometimes it is small or even invisible.

It is the threat, if we don't kill the virus, the virus will kill you and me and everyone else.

Can you imagine stopping only a partial spreading of a deadly virus?

It is not the Qassam Rockets; it is the people behind the Qassam Rockets that we need to go after.

This is an Epidemic Threat to the entire world.

In the last 60 years, every gesture of PEACE by Israel only met with escalated VIOLENCE

Every PEACE PROPOSAL, whether it is multi-lateral, bi-lateral, or uni-lateral was never HONORED by the terrorists.

Enough is enough

However, in this time of extreme difficulties, we shall not lose HOPE

We shall say yes to Peace SHALOM

We shall say yes to Life L'Chaim

And we shall forever say yes to an eternal Israel Am Yisrael Chai!